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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays that broadly deal with the international
economics and development.
The first chapter provides empirical evidence of the prevalence and importance of
intangible capital transfer within multinational corporations (MNCs). Using a unique
data set of Korean multinational foreign affiliates, I find that most of the foreign
affiliates have managers transferred from their parent, while almost half are isolated
from the parent in terms of physical trade. Furthermore, the transferred managers
are positively associated with labor productivity, while physical trade from the parent
is less so. I consider two possibilities for this productivity effect: (1) the managers
transferred from the parent are simply more efficient than native managers; and (2)
they provide knowledge that increases the productivity of all inputs. I find that the
latter is consistent with the data. My findings provide evidence that transferring
managers from the parent is a main source of benefit from foreign direct investment
(FDI) to foreign affiliates because the managers transfer firm-specific knowledge.
The second chapter analyzes importance role of service or other sectors for eco-
nomic growth of manufacturing. Productivity in agriculture or services has long been
understood as playing an important role in the growth of manufacturing. In this paper
we provide an endogenous growth model in which manufacturing growth is stimulated
by the non-manufacturing sector that provides goods used for both research and final
consumption. The model permits to evaluatation of two policy options for stimu-
lating manufacturing growth: (1) a country imports more non-manufacturing goods
from a foreign country with a higher productivity; or (2) the country increases pro-
ductivity of domestic non-manufacturing. We find that both policies increase welfare
of the economy, but depending on the policy the manufacturing sector responses dif-
ferently. Specifically, employment and value added in manufacturing rise with policy
i
(1), but contract with policy (2). Therefore, specialization through importing non-
manufacturing goods explains how some Asian economies experience fast growth in
the manufacturing sector without progress in the other sectors.
The third chapter tests for the importance of composition effects in affecting levels
and changes of education wage premiums. In this paper I revisit composition effects
in the context of Korea. Korea’s large and rapid expansion of education makes it
an ideal place to look for composition effects. A large, policy-induced increase in
attainment in the 1980s offers additional scope for identifying composition effects. I
find strong evidence that the policy-induced expansion of education lowered educa-
tion wage premiums for the affected cohorts, but only weak evidence that the trend
expansion of education lowered education wage premiums.
ii
To Youngeun whose love, support and devotion made all my achievements possible
and to our lovely girls, Cheryl and Isabella who are the most precious gift.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research has been benefitted greatly from the support and guidance of my ad-
visors: Daniel Silverman, Edward C. Prescott and Todd Schoellman. Special thanks
go to Dan, who joined the committee in 2012 and took responsibility as the committee
chair. I would also like to thank Natalia Ramondo, David Lagakos and Seung Ahn
who provided a valuable guidance and feedback on earlier versions of this.
For thoughtful comments and insight, I thank the seminar and conference partici-
pants at Arizona State University, Minneapolis Fed, Korea University, 2013 Midwest
Macro Meeting and 2013 CEA Meeting.
I would like to thank my parents and other family members. They always support
and encourage me with the best wishes. I also owe a huge debt to James Kerber and
Cheryl Kerber. They never hesitate to help and support me as parents in the states.
Finally, the second chapter of this dissertation is coauthored with Zhizhuang
(Andy) Ge and the third chapter is coauthored with Todd Schoellman and Hakki
Lee. I am grateful to have such dedicated and talented colleagues.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER
1 INTANGIBLE CAPITAL TRANSFER WITHIN MULTINATIONALS . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Multinational Corporations Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Employee Transfers vs. Physical Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1 Effect of Managers on Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.2 Determinants of Managers from the Parent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.3 Time Variation of Number of Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 SPECIALIZATION AND UNBALANCED SECTOR GROWTH . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2.2 Manufacturing sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.3 Non-manufacturing sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.4 Final Good Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.5 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.6 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.7 Equilibrium Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
v
CHAPTER Page
2.2.8 Non-Manufacturing sector: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2.9 Manufacturing sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.10 Final Aggregation sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.11 Market Clearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Comparative Statics for Parameter θ and λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.1 Extended Model for Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.2 Simulation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 Policy-Induced Variation in College Labor Supply and the Skill Premium 63
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 Education and Education Policy in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.1 An Instrumental Variable Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.2 A Distributional Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
APPENDIX
A APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.1 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.2 Derivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B.1 Proof of Lemma and Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
vi
CHAPTER Page
C APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.1 Data Descriptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.1.1 Sample for Analysis 2: Kaymak 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.1.2 Sample for Analysis 3: Juhn, Kim, and Vella 2005 . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.2 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1.1 Foreign Affiliates of Korean MNCs in 2010, by Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Foreign Affiliates of Korean MNCs in 2010, by Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Composition of Purchases and Sales in Korean Affiliates in 2010 . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Composition of Employees in Korean Affiliates in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Fraction of Korean Affiliates in 2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.6 Share of Internal Shipments and Workers in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.7 Effect of Managers from the Parent on Labor Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.8 The Share of Korean Managers over Affiliates’ Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.9 Effect on Labor Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.10 Effect of Physical Trades within MNCs on Labor Productivity . . . . . . . . 27
1.11 Determinant of the Share of Koreans in Management Positions . . . . . . . . 31
1.12 Change in the Number of Managers over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Growth Rate of Labor Productivity from 1977-1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 Parameters of the Model for the Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.1 Estimated Increase in College Attainment Induced by Policy Change . . 72
3.2 Return to Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Patterns of the Return to Education: 1980–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Effects of Cohort-Specific College Share on Wages of College Graduate
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.1 Effect on Labor Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1.1 Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Korean Managers . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Korean Production Workers . 13
1.3 Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Firm Imports, by Country 15
1.4 Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Firm Imports, by Industry 16
1.5 Cumulative Distribution of Affiliates with respect to the Number of
Managers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1 Distribution of Firm’s Productivity after Increases in θ and λ . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2 Distribution of Firm’s Productivity after Increases in λ on Different θs 59
3.1 Changes in Korean Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Decomposing the Some College Group in the U.S. and Korea . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 Fraction College Graduates by Birth Cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 A Simplified View of Composition Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5 Log Change in Relative Wage and College Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.1 Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Family Imports . . . . . . . . 91
A.2 FDistribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Family Imports . . . . . . 92
C.1 Educational Attainment by Birth Cohort (Men) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
C.2 Educational Attainment by Birth Cohort (Women) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
ix
Chapter 1
INTANGIBLE CAPITAL TRANSFER WITHIN MULTINATIONALS
1.1 Introduction
Productivity differences are the main source of income differences across countries.
1 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the main channels for international
linkages and knowledge transfers to improve productivity. A large literature provides
empirical evidence that FDI increases the recipient’s productivity. 2 However, the
previous literature does not provide empirical evidence of what benefit transfers to the
recipient and how this transfer increases the recipient’s productivity. In this paper, I
provide empirical evidence of the benefit from FDI by examining foreign affiliates of
multinational corporations (MNCs).
The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether managers sent from a parent to its
foreign affiliates transfer intangible capital and, if so, whether the benefits from doing
so are substantial. I document three findings using data on Korean MNCs. First,
managers from the parent at foreign affiliates are common relative to production
workers from the parent or to physical trade within the MNC. Second, the managers
substantially raise the foreign affiliate’s productivity. Third, the managers’ presence
is inconsistent with the simple view that they are simply more efficient than native
managers as an input, but is consistent with the view that they transfer firm–specific
knowledge that increases the productivity of all inputs.
The previous literature emphasizes the importance of knowledge transfers through
1Hall and Jones (1999), Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Comin and Hobijn (2004).
2Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998), Aitken and Harrison (1999), Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm (1999),
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Yasar and Morrison Paul (2007).
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FDI. Theoretical work, including Markusen (1984), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) and McGrattan and Prescott (2009), argues that an MNC can transfer its
firm-specific knowledge – such as proprietary technology and superior marketing or
management techniques – to its foreign affiliates to overcome difficulties in a foreign
country. 3 At the aggregate level, quantitative studies, including Burstein and
Monge-Naranjo (2009), McGrattan and Prescott (2009), Ramondo (2012) and Ra-
mondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013), emphasize that such knowledge transfers through
MNCs are an important source of welfare gains to the host country. However, there
is little empirical work to provide evidence about how an MNC transfers its specific
knowledge to its affiliates. The contribution of this paper is to bridge that gap by
providing empirical evidence on intangible capital transfers within MNCs.
This paper exploits a unique data set, the “Benchmark Survey of Korean Multi-
national Affiliates Abroad”, which comprises data collected by the Korean Export
Import Bank (EXIM). The novel feature of the data is that they track the assign-
ment of employees and of physical trade in foreign affiliates of Korean multinationals.
These data allow me to observe employee transfers and physical trade within MNCs.
4 From details regarding employees and transactions, I document three new facts:
1. Intangible capital – especially via manager transfer – is more common. That
3This literature refers to firm-specific knowledge by different terms, such as knowledge capital
(Markusen (1984)), managerial ability (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)) and technology capital
(McGrattan and Prescott (2009)). It is unique knowledge that a firm possesses and is different from
other inputs because it can be used in multiple locations at the same time, but does not hurt the
returns of existing operations.
4The two channels, physical trade and employee transfers, as avenues to transfer knowledge have
been proposed and investigated theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, literature motivated
by vertical FDI, including Helpman (1984), and literature about economic development, including
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), emphasize the trade
of intermediate goods to transfer knowledge. Empirically, Keller (2002), Madsen (2007) Nishioka
and Ripoll (2012) and Keller and Yeaple (2013), among others, provide evidence that intermediate
goods augmented with knowledge are an important channel to transfer knowledge from developed
countries to developing countries. However, Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde (2001) and Glass and Saggi
(2002), among others, emphasize the importance of employee moves to transfer knowledge across
firms. Empirically, Balsvik (2011), using Norwegian manufacturing, shows that employees from
MNCs increase productivity of non-MNCs.
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is, more affiliates have managers from the parent than production workers or
physical trade.
2. Managers from the parent are positively associated with an affiliate’s labor
productivity.
3. The percentage of native managers increases as the affiliates become larger.
The data indicate that manager flows, but neither production worker flows nor
physical trade, are a key link between parents and their affiliates. In 2010, foreign
affiliates had employees from the parent in ten percent of their management positions
but in only one percent in their production positions. Furthermore, 81 percent of
the foreign affiliates had at least one manager from the parent, whereas only 30
percent had any production workers from the parent. In addition, most of the foreign
affiliates are isolated from the parent in terms of physical trade, which indicates that
firm-specific knowledge is not transferred in the form of physical technologies. A
large fraction, 44 percent, of foreign affiliates made precisely zero purchases from the
parent. Even if I include indirect imports from the parent through other affiliates
within the same MNCs, 35 percent of the affiliates still had no purchases.
In addition, I find that managers from the parent are positively associated with
labor productivity. The estimation results show that a ten-percent increase in the
share of managers from the parent over total managers is positively associated with
a four-percent increase in value-added per employee of a foreign affiliate. However,
intra-firm or family trades have smaller or insignificant effects on labor productivity.
The correlation between the share of intra-firm or family trade over total transactions
and value-added per employee is less than one percent, or statistically insignificant.
Even though most foreign affiliates of MNCs have managers from the parent and
though they are positively associated with the affiliate’s productivity, only a few
3
managers are transferred from the parent, and the number of the managers is not
dependent on the affiliate’s size. Most of the foreign affiliates have fewer than ten
managers from the parent, while the number of native managers seems to increase as
the affiliates become larger. Thus, the share of managers from the parent over total
managers tends to decrease as the affiliates become larger. In the context of a stan-
dard model of firm productivity, this result implies that managers from the parent
are not more efficient than managers from the host country, but that managers from
the parent transfer knowledge that can improve the affiliate’s productivity. Further-
more, my result also shows that managers from the parent can provide information
or knowledge held by the MNC but not knowledge specific to the host country. Thus,
these findings provide evidence that parents transfer firm-specific knowledge to their
affiliates through managers.
My findings support a view of the importance of transferring intangible capital
within MNCs or multi-plant firms that share the same ownership, as in Atalay, Hor-
tacsu, and Syverson (2012) and Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2012). Atalay,
Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012) show that even if a U.S. firm owns its affiliate within
its production chain, it is hard to see physical transactions. As an alternative expla-
nation, they suggest that vertical ownership promotes efficient intra-firm transfers of
intangible inputs. Using U.S. multinationals, Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2012)
also show that U.S. MNCs are isolated from the parents in terms of physical trade,
and that input-output links between the affiliates and the parent are not associated
with intra-firm flows of physical goods. They suggest that the comparative advan-
tage of MNCs may come from transferring intangible assets, not from physical trades.
Neither Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2012) nor Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl
(2012), however, provides explicit evidence of an intangible capital transfer. In this
paper, I show new evidence of intangible capital transfer through manager transfers
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and examine the characteristics of the managers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
Korean MNCs foreign affiliates data and documents some interesting facts using it.
Section 1.3 provides a simple model for choosing a manager from either the parent
or the host country. Section 1.4 presents an empirical analysis of foreign affiliates in
MNCs using Korean MNCs data related to patterns of managers and discusses the
results from the estimations. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Multinational Corporations Data
The firm-level data set is from the “Benchmark Survey of Korean Multinational
Affiliates Abroad” collected by the state-owned EXIM and conducted yearly since
1999. In 2010, for example, 35,950 Korean foreign affiliates operating abroad re-
ported to the EXIM. Among them, the EXIM attempted to survey 7,332 affiliates
that had total accumulated investments of more than $1 million and are required
by law to submit their annual business report. My original sample from the EXIM
has details of 3,893 affiliates that responded to the 2010 survey. 5 It covers 11
percent of the total number of Korean affiliates abroad but 65 percent of the total
accumulated investments of Korean MNCs in that year. The data are, therefore, a
non-random sample that overrepresents relatively large foreign affiliates in terms of
total accumulated investments.
The key feature of these data is information about employees and trade of foreign
affiliates abroad from 2005 to 2010, including 3,583 parents investing in 5,970 foreign
5Under some circumstances, such a close inspection, the EXIM may excuse an affiliate from
submitting its annual business report. The EXIM also dropped some observations due to reliability.
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affiliates abroad. 6 Some affiliates reported either total sales or purchases of zero for
a certain year, and I exclude these for that year from my analysis. The exclusion does
not change my main results: The final sample has 2,349 parents investing in 3,908
affiliates. On average, in 2010, a parent had 1.9 affiliates, and the median parent had
one affiliate. A parent had, at most, 55 affiliates throughout the world. Additionally,
the data set provides information regarding the country and industry in which each
affiliate operates. 7
The foreign affiliates in these data operate actively in both developing and de-
veloped countries. 8 Table 1.1 shows the top 20 countries hosting Korean MNCs
in terms of number of affiliates in 2010. In the sample, China hosted the most Ko-
rean affiliates, 1,033, with total sales of $124,485 million and 465,936 employees. The
U.S. hosted the second-most Korean MNCs with 244 affiliates, total sales of $69,912
million and 30,553 employees. In terms of the number of employees only 223,323
Vietnam hosted the second-most Korean MNCs with 193 affiliates and $5,597 million
in sales. As Table 1.1 shows, these affiliates operate in various countries that are
quite different by market size or endowments.
Across industries, Korean MNCs operate their foreign affiliates mainly in manu-
facturing. Table 1.2 shows that 69 percent of Korean foreign affiliates were in man-
ufacturing in 2010. They hired more than 90 percent of the total employees and
accounted for more than 55 percent of the total sales of the Korean foreign affiliates.
The wholesale and retail trade industry hosted the second-most Korean affiliates
abroad in terms of number of affiliates. They hired relatively fewer employees, but
6Not all affiliates reported for the entire six years. As I noted before, 3,893 affiliates responded
in 2010.
7Industries are classified by a two-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) and is
broken down into 65 industries.
8I define as a developing country one in which PPP GDP per capita from Penn World Table 7.1
was lower than that of Korea, $25,029 in 2010, and as a developed country if not. Even if I consider
the breakpoint as $20,000, the result is not different.
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Table 1.1: Foreign Affiliates of Korean MNCs in 2010, by Country
Country Number of Affiliates Sales ($millions) Employees
China 1,033 124,485 465,936
US 244 66,912 30,553
Vietnam 193 5,597 223,323
Indonesia 89 11,270 114,601
Japan 77 15,073 3,701
Panama 54 1,412 1,600
Hong Kong 49 16,752 18,719
India 47 9,756 30,686
Thailand 42 6,041 16,810
Slovakia 31 10,992 12,629
Germany 31 23,632 2,113
Malaysia 24 5,935 2,771
Singapore 22 35,823 1,561
Taiwan 22 17,855 3,238
Poland 21 6,545 12,205
Russia 20 8,292 7,448
Philippine 19 2,594 16,150
Mexico 19 3,854 9,185
Turkey 17 2,378 4,496
Canada 17 5,928 1,143
Notes: The table shows the top 20 countries in 2010 with the most Korean foreign
affiliates in the sample.
they sold, on average, more than manufacturing. Although other sectors are not as
prevalent as manufacturing or wholesale and retail trade, Korean MNCs invest in a
variety of industries.
The distinctive feature of this data set is that it provides details of foreign affiliates’
employee information. It records the number of employees of affiliates categorized
7
Table 1.2: Foreign Affiliates of Korean MNCs in 2010, by Industry
Industry Number of Affiliates Sales ($millions) Employees
Manufacturing 1,597 244,429 1,008,455
Wholesale and Retail Trade 325 166,747 52,863
Real Estate and Renting 99 1,594 3,923
Transportation 59 10,183 11,459
Publishing and Communications 50 925 4,587
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 35 3,452 2,203
Construction 33 1,122 6,089
Mining 31 13,775 12,886
Arts, Sports and Recreation Related Services 28 119 2,157
Hotels and Restaurants 19 384 3,417
Agriculture, Forestry And Fishery 16 53 972
Business Facilities Management and Support Services 6 849 498
Other Service 5 19 277
Education Service 4 4 84
Electricity, Sewerage and Waste Management 3 46 21
Human Health and Social Work 3 3 60
Materials Recovery and Remediation 1 3 40
Notes: The table sorts industries in terms of number of Korean foreign affiliates operating in 2010 in the sample.
The industry classification follows KSIC.
by whether the employees are natives or Koreans and which one of four positions
they hold in the affiliate: Executive, Manager, Sales or Production. Henceforth, I
classify employees in Executive and Manager positions as managers and in Sales and
Production positions as production workers, following Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-
Hansberg (2012). Furthermore, I assume that all Korean employees are sent from
the parent in Korea. In view of the fact that the Korean government allowed people
to hold only one citizenship before 2011, being Korean means that the individual
is a permanent Korean resident; and because it is rare that an MNC transfers a
worker from a third-party firm to an affiliate, my assumption is reasonable. From
this assumption, I can distinguish two types of managers by origin.
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Another advantage of this data set is that I have relatively detailed information
on sales and purchases in the affiliates. I have the value, in dollors, of affiliates’
exports and imports with other partners around the world. A partner is identified
by two criteria: whether it is within the same MNC; and whether it is in the same
country, either Korea or another country. 9 From this information, I define sales
and purchases directly with the parent as intra-firm exports and imports, respectively,
and with the parent and partners within the same MNC as intra-family exports and
imports.
In what follows, I analyze the composition of employees and the pattern of trade
for the foreign affiliates. In particular, I document which interaction – transferring
employees or physical trade – is more prevalent between a parent and its foreign
affiliates.
1.2.2 Employee Transfers vs. Physical Trade
This section compares the relative prevalence of physical trade and employee trans-
fers to establish stylized facts. Interactions through either physical trade or employee
transfers can be observed within MNCs to determine if firm-specific knowledge is
transferred through one or both of these methods. I show that manager transfers are
common, and far more common than either production worker transfers or physical
trade within MNCs. This provides insight into why a firm decides on FDI instead of
outsourcing and becomes organized into families.
A broad overview of the aggregate data could lead into the mistaken conclusion
that physical trade flows, and not employee flows, link MNCs to foreign affiliates.
At the aggregate level, intra-firm or family trades are a prominent portion of total
sales and total purchases, whereas employees from the parent represent a very small
9In the data, the parent is the only partner who is within the same MNC in Korea.
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portion of total employees in foreign affiliates abroad. These affiliates hire employees
mainly from the host country instead of transferring them from the parent. In 2010,
Korean MNCs affiliates in the sample hired 1,109,991 total employees, but only two
percent, 26,029, were Korean. In contrast, they bought 36 percent and 59 percent of
total purchases and sold 16 percent and 34 percent of the total sales through intra-
firm and family trade, respectively. If one considers only the aggregate statistics, it
would seem that that MNCs depend more on physical trade, especially imports, than
on employee transfers.
Table 1.3: Composition of Purchases and Sales in Korean Affiliates in 2010
Intra-firm Intra-family Domestic others Foreign others
(including parent) (including Korea)
Purchases 35.5% 59.2% 29.5% 11.2%
Sales 15.9% 33.7% 51.9% 14.5%
Note: Domestic others means third-party firms in the same host country. Foreign others means third-party firms
in the other countries including Korea.
There is, however, a different pattern to the composition of employees across
different positions. Even though the share of employees from the parent is very
small, the share of employees in management positions is relatively higher than that
in production positions. In 2010, the share of Korean managers was ten percent,
while the share of Korean production workers was one percent.
On the extensive margin, furthermore, most foreign affiliates had at least one
Korean manager. In 2010, among 2,314 affiliates, 81 percent of Korean foreign affili-
ates had at least one Korean manager, while only 30 percent had Korean production
workers. 10 As shown in Table 1.5, even in developed countries, where the supply of
10With the exception of 14 affiliates, 407 Korean affiliates had both a Korean production worker
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Table 1.4: Composition of Employees in Korean Affiliates in 2010
Position Korean Native Total
Executive 26.6% 73.4% 103,26
Manager 8.7% 91.3% 123,547
Sales 3.9% 96.1% 70,646
Production 1.1% 98.9% 905,472
Total 2.3% 97.7% 1,109,991
Notes: The second and third columns show the share of Ko-
rean or native employees for each position in Korean foreign
affiliates in 2010.
labor with managerial skills is higher, 72 percent of Korean affiliates still had some
Korean managers. The difference in patterns between Korean managers and produc-
tion workers at foreign affiliates is striking in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2
shows that most foreign affiliates’ share of Korean production workers is less than ten
percent. Figure 1.1 shows, however, that the share of Korean managers varies across
the affiliates.
Regarding physical trade, however, almost half of the affiliates had zero purchases
from the parent. In Table 1.5, 44 percent of the affiliates had no purchases through
intra-firm imports in 2010, and this pattern is the same across developing and devel-
oped countries. Because 32 percent of the parents had more than a single affiliate
abroad, I consider the possibility of physical trade from the parent to an affiliate
through the other affiliates within the MNC. This is captured, in part, by intra-
family trade. Even after considering this kind of physical trade not only from the
parent directly, but also from the related affiliates indirectly, 35 percent of the total
and a Korean manager. So there are only a few affiliates that have only Korean production workers
without Korean managers.
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Table 1.5: Fraction of Korean Affiliates in 2010
Total Developing Developed
Imports from parent (> 0) 56.1% 56.3% 55.8%
Exports to parent (> 0) 38.1% 41.8% 26.6%
Imports from family (> 0) 65.5% 65.1% 66.7%
Exports to family (> 0) 54.5% 57.5% 44.7%
Korean manager (> 0) 81.4% 84.4% 71.9%
Korean production worker (> 0) 29.9% 30.8% 27.2%
# of Affiliates 2314 1749 552
Notes: In rows one through four, the table shows the share of Korean foreign affiliates that had
trades with either the parent or the family. Family includes the parent and other affiliates who
share the same parent. The fifth and sixth rows show the share of Korean foreign affiliates that
have a positive number of Koreans in the each position. Developed and developing countries are
classified by whether their PPP GDP per capita is higher than that of Korea.
affiliates still had zero intra-family trade in 2010.
When they do occur, intra-firm and intra-family imports are most likely to occur
in only large affiliates. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the distribution of the fraction
of the foreign affiliates with respect to the share of intra-firm imports in 2010, by
country and by industry, respectively. The distribution is similar to that of Korean
production workers in Figure 1.2 but not that of Korean managers in Figure 1.1.
More than half of the foreign affiliates bought less than ten percent of their purchases
from their parent. Table 1.6 shows that the median affiliate bought only five percent
of its purchases through intra-firm imports, while affiliates, on average, bought 27
percent of their purchases through intra-firm imports. Combined with the fact that
the affiliates bought more than one third of their purchases from the parent on the
aggregate level, the positive skewness implies that most intra-firm imports come from
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Korean Managers
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Notes: The fraction of Korean foreign affiliates depending on the share of Korean
managers over total managers in 2010. I define developing and developed countries
based on Korea’s PPP GDP per capita.
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Korean Production Workers
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Note: The fraction of Korean foreign affiliates depending on the share of Korean
production workers over total production workers in 2010. I define developing and
developed countries based on Korea’s PPP GDP per capita.
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some large affiliates. Although intra-family imports were a little more common than
intra-firm imports, the pattern is basically the same. 11 These stylized facts are
observable across both the countries and industries.
Table 1.6: Share of Internal Shipments and Workers in 2010
Share of. Average 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
Imports from parent 27.4% 0.0% 5.0% 51.7% 92.0% 100.0%
Exports to parent 19.1% 0.0% 0.0% 16.0% 94.5% 100.0%
Imports from family 40.6% 0.0% 28.0% 85.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Exports to family 34.1% 0.0% 2.0% 88.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Korean manager 27.8% 6.3% 15.4% 33.3% 100.0% 100.0%
Korean production worker 4.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 7.5% 21.9%
In summary, the aggregate data mask substantial firm-level differences. Employee
flows seem insignificant because managers from the parent make up such a small
share of total employment. Aggregated trade flows mask the fact that a majority
of affiliates have no trade at all with the parent. This fact suggests that aggregate-
level data can lead to improper conclusions about the importance of physical trade
between the foreign affiliates and the parent within the MNCs. As my data showed,
only a few large foreign affiliates actually heavily depend on intra-firm and inta-family
trade, while most foreign affiliates do not. As in Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl
(2012) and Baldwin and Okubo (2012), this pattern is also observable in U.S. and
Japanese MNCs. Aggregate data, therefore, can possibly overestimate the importance
of physical trade within MNCs. Furthermore, my sample is already likely to have large
foreign affiliates, so in that sense, the entire population of foreign affiliates in MNCs
11See Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Firm Imports, by
Country
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Note: The fraction of Korean foreign affiliates depending on the share of purchases
from the parent in 2010. I define developing and developed countries based on
Korea’s PPP GDP per capita.
would be more isolated from the parent or other family affiliates in terms of physical
trade.
I discussed two mechanisms behind the interactions between a parent and its
foreign affiliates: physical trade and transfer of employees. Overall, the data suggest
that manager transfers are more common than intra-firm or intra-family imports on
the extensive margin. Then, I explore what motivates manager transfers from the
parent to the foreign affiliates and how manager transfers are the main mechanism
to have comparative advantages for foreign affiliates in practice. To examine these
issues, I provide a simple model of a foreign affiliate’s decision to fill management
positions from the parent or the host country.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Firm Imports, by
Industry
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Note: The fraction of Korean foreign affiliates depending on the share of purchases
from the parent in 2010. I define manufacturing and others following KSIC.
1.3 Model
In this section, I introduce a partial equilibrium model describing the choice of
managers for a foreign affiliate. The previous section documented two key facts about
MNCs’ intangible capital transfers and physical trades. First, an MNC transfers its
managers, but not its production workers, to its foreign affiliates. Second, in terms
of physical trade, foreign affiliates are isolated from the parent. This suggests the
importance of managers from the parent but does not prove that they are at the
foreign affiliates to transfer firm-specific knowledge. A natural alternative is that
they are just better managers than managers from the host country. Therefore, I
develop a model that embeds both hypotheses, and I study its predictions. The
model yields predictions that distinguish between the two hypotheses. The model
also guides what moments I look at in the data for empirical analysis in the next
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section.
The model describes a decision regarding a foreign affiliate’s production. The
foreign affiliate uses two kinds of labor services for production, managers M and
production workers L. The affiliate can hire managers from either the parent Mk
or the host country Mn. Based on the facts from the previous section, the affiliate
hires production workers only from the host country. Using these labor services, the
affiliate produces its output Y according to the following production function:
Y =
(
F (Mk)
)β(
(αMk +Mn)γL1−γ
)1−β
(1.1)
In equation 1.1, F (·) is second-order differentiable, F ′(·) is non-negative and F ′′(·)
is non-positive. And there is an M¯k satisfying F
′(M¯k) = 0 and F ′(Mk) → ∞ as
Mk → 0. I assume that 0 ≤ β < 1 and 0 < γ < 1. The parameter α is non-negative
and denotes the productivity of the managers from the parent relative to that of the
managers from the host country.
The production function has two features depending on two key parameters, β and
α. First, it allows for the possibility of managers from the parent being augmented
with knowledge. If β is positive, these managers from the parent work for the affiliate
as an input but also increase the productivity of each input used. 12 If β equals
zero, the managers from the parent work only as an input for management. Second,
the parameter α is the productivity of managers from the parent relative to that of
managers from the host country. If α is bigger than one, this means that managers
from the parent are more productive than managers from the host country. 13
From the production function, I can derive a prediction about how managers
12This is a similar setup to the model in McGrattan and Prescott (2009), Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-
Clare (2009) and Ramondo (2012).
13See Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009).
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from the parent affect productivity of the foreign affiliate. Since the affiliate uses
only labor services as inputs for production, I consider the labor productivity of the
foreign affiliate. From the production function, I can derive equation 1.2 14 :
log
(
Y
E
)
= βlog
(
F (Mk)
M
)
+ γ(1− β)log
(
(α− 1)M
k
M
+ 1
)
+
+(1− γ)(1− β)log
(
1− M
E
)
+ (γ + β − γβ)log
(
M
E
)
(1.2)
In equation 1.2, M is the total number of managers, Mk +Mn, and E is the total
number of employees, M + L, so LHS of the equation is the logarithm of labor pro-
ductivity of the affiliate. The equation demonstrates that when the share of managers
from the parent over total managers changes, a change of labor productivity depends
on the parameters, α and β. Table 1.7 shows the effect of the share of managers
from the parent on labor productivity. When β is equal to zero, the first term in
equation 1.2 becomes zero and only α determines the effect. If α is bigger than one,
which means that managers from the parent are more productive than managers from
the host country, the share of managers from the parent is positively associated with
labor productivity. If α is smaller than one, the share of managers from the parent
is negatively associated with labor productivity.
If β is positive, managers from the parent work as an input and increase produc-
tivity, just as technology does. So, if managers from the parent are a better input
than managers from the host country, in which α > 1, it is trivial that the share of
managers from the parent is positively associated with labor productivity because it
is positively associated with both the first and second terms in equation 1.2. If α is
smaller than one, the relation between the share of managers from the parent and
labor productivity is ambiguous because it is positively associated with the first term
14The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.2 provides details of how the equation is derived.
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Table 1.7: Effect of Managers from the Parent on Labor Productivity
α > 1 α < 1
β = 0 Positive Negative
β > 0 Positive Ambiguous
Note: The table shows predictions of
∂log(Y/E)
∂log(Mk/M)
given M
E
from the equation 1.2.
but negatively with the second term in equation 1.2.
Proposition 1. If β > 0 and α < 1, there exists a feasible choice of a foreign affiliate
that satisfies that ∂log
(
Y
E
)/
∂log
(
Mk
M
)
is positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that even if managers from the parent are less pro-
ductive than managers from the host country, there is still a possibility that managers
from the parent increase the foreign affiliate’s labor productivity. The reason is that
they can transfer knowledge that increases all other inputs’ productivity.
From the impact of managers from the parent on labor productivity, I note that
both hypotheses – providing better input, in which β=0 and α > 0, and transferring
knowledge from the parent, in which β > 0 – support a positive relation between the
share of managers from the parent and labor productivity.
With the production function and an exogenous shock z, a foreign affiliate maxi-
mizes profit so that Mk, Mn and L are the solution to
max
Mk, Mn, L
zY − wkMk − wnMn − wLL (1.3)
s.t
Mk ≥ 0, Mn ≥ 0 and L ≥ 0, (1.4)
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where price of the output is numeraire and wj|j={k,n,L} are the wage paid per unit of
Mk, Mn and L, respectively. z is an exogenous shock that affects the affiliate output
and follows
z = eηa+ηmt+ηct+ηc+ηi+ηt (1.5)
ηa is the fixed characteristic of the affiliate affecting its labor productivity. For
example, different affiliates can have different FDIs or initial investments, and each
affiliate faces a different market for its product. So, these kinds of affiliate-specific
characteristics can affect its output. ηmt is an exogenous shock coming from the
MNC. Tintelnot (2012) shows that, with a fixed cost for a foreign affiliate entering a
market, the affiliate as an export platform can be influenced by other affiliates within
the same MNC. ηct is an exogenous shock that captures the country-time fixed-effect.
For example, in a horizontal FDI mode, Markusen (1984) points out that, to avoid
trade costs that are motivated by serving the market in the host country, the foreign
affiliate output would be affected by domestic demand. ηc is a country fixed-effect that
captures different TFP across countries. ηi captures different characteristics across
industries, such as R&D or capital intensity. And ηt captures the time fixed-effect.
My sample includes the great recession in 2009, so the time fixed-effect captures the
global shock for each time period.
The prediction about the pattern of foreign affiliates’ choice between managers
from the parent and managers from the host country is derived from the foreign affil-
iate’s maximization problem. With the Cobb-Douglas combination of managers and
production workers, a higher exogenous shock induces an affiliate to hire more man-
agers and more production workers to produce more output. Depending on parame-
ters β and α and the wages for each labor service, the affiliate will choose managers
from either the parent or the host country. Table 1.8 shows how the share of the
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managers from the parent over total managers changes as the affiliate becomes larger
with a larger z. If β is equal to zero, the affiliate chooses either all managers from the
parent or all managers from the host country, depending on the marginal return per
unit cost because they are perfectly substitutable. 15 It is trivial, in other words,
that the affiliate hires only managers from the parent if αw
n
wk
> 1 and β is positive,
which means that the marginal return per unit cost of managers from the parent from
working only as an input for management is always larger than the marginal return
per unit cost of native managers. The reason is that the whole marginal return from
managers from the parent is larger than that derived from only working as an input
because of the additional benefit of transferring knowledge.
Table 1.8: The Share of Korean Managers over Affiliates’ Sizes
αω
n
ωk
> 1 αω
n
ωk
< 1
β = 0 Constant (equal to 1) Constant (equal to 0)
β > 0 Constant (equal to 1) Ambiguous
Note: The table shows predictions of
∂(Mk(z)/M(z))
∂Y (z)
from the affiliates’ max-
imization problem.
I focus on the most interesting part – the case in which β is positive and αw
n
wk
< 1.
In this case, managers from the parent transfer knowledge, but their marginal return
per unit cost as an input for management positions only is lower than that of managers
from the host country. In this case, the prediction of the share of managers from the
parent over the affiliate’s size is ambiguous.
Proposition 2. If β > 0 and αw
n
wk
< 1, considering z′ and z such that z′ > z,
there exist optimal choices from the affiliates’ maximization problems that satisfy that
15Even if I consider the case in which managers from the parent and the host country have a
constant elasticity of substitution, the share of the managers from the parent is still constant, but
not zero or one, as the affiliate becomes larger.
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Yamcit(z
′) > Yamcit(z) and M
k
Mk+Mn
(z′) < M
k
Mk+Mn
(z).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Corollary 1. If β > 0 and αw
n
wk
< 1, all optimal choices from the affiliates’ maxi-
mization problems across z satisfy that Mk(z) is positive and bounded from above by
M¯k.
Proof. See proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.2; it is trivial that the marginal
product per unit cost of Mk(z) is lower than the marginal product per unit cost of
Mn(z) for all Mk(z) ≥ M¯k.
Proposition 2 shows that even if managers from the parent are less efficient inputs
than managers from the host country, there is a reason why the affiliates still utilize
them. Interestingly, the affiliates limit the number of managers from the parent
because the benefit from these additional managers transferring knowledge becomes
smaller and smaller. The affiliates receive knowledge transfers at a certain level, and
additional managers from the parent would not increase productivity as much as
before because F (·) is concave. Then, the affiliates fill management positions with
managers from the host country because they are more efficient than managers from
the parent. In this case, as Corollary 1 says, the number of managers from the parent
in management positions is constant over the affiliates’ size. 16
In this section, I used the simple model to provide different predictions depending
on the characteristics of managers from the parent. In the next section, I use the data
to examine which predictions from the model are consistent with foreign affiliates
abroad.
16In the case in which managers from the parent and the host country have a constant elasticity
of substitution, Mk is bounded from above only with β > 0 and αw
n
wk
< 1.
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1.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I examine the characteristics of managers from the parent, using
the data on foreign affiliates of Korean MNCs with guidelines from the simple model
in the previous section. From the assumption in Section 1.2, which is that all Koreans
in foreign affiliates originally come from the parent in Korea, I can distinguish between
managers from the parent and from the host country. Thus, I examine which of the
model’s predictions are consistent with Korean foreign affiliates’ data. The model
in the previous section shows that two key parameters are crucial for the decision
between managers from the parent and from the host country. The first one is β,
which determines whether managers from the parent transfer their knowledge to the
foreign affiliate. The second one is α, which determines whether managers from the
parent are a better input than managers from the host country. Depending on these
two parameters, the model’s predictions about the pattern of managers from the
parent and their effect on the foreign affiliate vary.
1.4.1 Effect of Managers on Productivity
First, I examine the effect of Korean managers on foreign affiliates’ productivity.
In the previous section, Table 1.7 shows the effect of managers from the parent on
labor productivity. Each column shows the sign of ∂log(Y/E)
∂log(Mk/M)
as given M
E
. To examine
which prediction is consistent with the data, I estimate the following equation.
Vamcit = βo + β1 · S1amcit + β2 · S2amcit +
+ β4 · ηa + β5 · ηmt + β6 · ηct + β7 · ηc + β8 · ηi + β9 · ηt + amcit (1.6)
In equation 1.6, the dependent variable (Vamcit) is labor productivity for affiliate
a within MNC m in country c, industry i and time t. I measure labor productivity
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as valued-added divided by the total number of employees. 17 S1amcit is the share of
Korean managers over total managers and S2amct is total managers over total employ-
ees. 18 I also control for exogenous shocks that affect the affiliate’s productivity. I
control for affiliate fixed-effect (ηa), country and time fixed-effect (ηct), country fixed-
effect (ηc), industry fixed-effect (ηi) and time fixed-effect (ηt) using dummy variables.
I also control for multinational and time fixed-effect (ηmt) using the sum of total sales
of affiliates that share the same parent, which captures the size of MNCs.
My estimation results from equation 1.6 using Korean foreign affiliates’ data show
that the share of Korean managers is positively associated with labor productivity.
Table 1.9 shows the estimation results. Column (1) in Table 1.9, shows that a ten-
percent increase in the share of Korean managers is positively associated with a
four-percent increase in labor productivity. In the previous section, I showed that
almost half of the Korean foreign affiliates are isolated from the parent in terms
of physical trade. However, I can test how intra-firm trade affects affiliates’ labor
productivity. In column (2) of Table 1.9, I consider affiliates that have intra-firm
imports and examine how the share of intra-firm imports over total purchases affects
their productivity. The result shows that a ten-percent increase in the share of intra-
firm imports over total purchases is positively associated with only a 0.8-percent
increase in labor productivity. So, not only are employee transfers in management
positions more common than physical imports from the parent, but the effect on labor
productivity is also more than four times larger than that of intra-firm imports.
One question that I can ask is whether physical import goods might be used
17The value added is calculated by total sales minus total purchases. In my data set, total
purchases include any costs to buy inputs from outside of the affiliate.
18Beside the predictions from the model, I include the variable S2amct for empirical purposes. I
want to double check whether my measure of labor productivity is valid. The previous literature
documents that management skills are positively associated with a firm’s productivity; see Bloom
and Reenen (2007). If I’ve measured labor productivity well, therefore, the sign of the coefficient
for S2amcit can be expected to be significantly positive.
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Table 1.9: Effect on Labor Productivity
Dependent Variable: log(Labor Productivity)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Korean managers
Total managers
) 0.406*** 0.383*** 0.372*** 0.344*** 0.325*** 0.547***
[0.033] [0.045] [0.064] [0.052] [0.050] [0.097]
log( Total managers
Total employees
) 0.519*** 0.485*** 0.438*** 0.449*** 0.418*** 0.676***
[0.037] [0.050] [0.073] [0.061] [0.060] [0.082]
log( Intra−firm import
Total purchase
) 0.081*** 0.040 0.057** 0.057** 0.194***
[0.023] [0.031] [0.024] [0.024] [0.067]
L.log(Korean managers
Total managers
) -0.038
[0.046]
L.log( Total managers
Total employees
) -0.023
[0.053]
L.log( Intra−firm import
Total purchase
) -0.039
[0.026]
Observations 8,370 5,168 2,939 3,994 3,964 1,204
R-squared 0.227 0.239 0.197 0.222 0.214 0.341
Number of Affiliates 3,164 2,047 1,247 1,603 1,603 446
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I control for affiliate fixed-effect, country and time fixed-effect, country fixed-effect,
industry fixed-effect and time fixed-effect using dummy variables. I also control for multi-
national and time fixed-effect using the sum of total sales of affiliates in the same MNC.
Of 10,416 affiliates, I drop 1,244 because their labor productivity is negative. For the first
column, I consider affiliates that have at least one Korean in a management position. For
the second column, I consider only affiliates that have positive intra-firm imports. For the
third column, I control for the one-year lagged variable for each explanatory variable. For the
fourth column, I consider only affiliates in the manufacturing sector. For the fifth and sixth
columns, I consider affiliates in developing and developed countries, respectively. For the
results regarding the whole sample using a different specification, see Table A.3 in Appendix
A.1.
for production with a time lag. Because the value-added of some observations was
negative and so was their labor productivity, I dropped 1,244 affiliates. It might be
possible, therefore, for an affiliate to buy intermediate goods from the parent to use
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in a future year. Therefore, considering this case, I use a time lag for each variable
and report the results in column (3). However, my result shows that the coefficient
of the share of Korean managers does not change much, but that of the share of
intra-firm imports becomes statistically insignificant. Since it might not be easy to
define physical trade in the non-manufacturing sector, I consider only samples in
the manufacturing sector. However, column (4) shows that the result is consistent
with that of column (2). Finally, I separate the sample into developing and developed
countries, but the results are consistent with those in the other columns. Interestingly,
column (6) shows that developed countries, which probably have better management
inputs, have a higher effect from Korean managers on labor productivity. 19
Even though I consider only the effect of intra-firm imports on labor productivity,
the effects of other intra-firm or family trades on labor productivity are also either
relatively small or statistically insignificant. Table 1.10 shows the effects of various
intra-firm and family trades on labor productivity. Despite the prevalence of intra-
family imports over intra-firm imports, the coefficient of intra-family imports is less
than half of that of intra-firm imports and is statistically insignificant. However, the
other intra-firm and family exports and trades are negatively associated with labor
productivity. One possible explanation could be transfer-pricing within MNCs, but
it is clear that intra-firm or family exports do not make the affiliate more productive.
The estimation result shows that the share of Korean managers is positively asso-
ciated with labor productivity. In particular, the coefficient is more than four times
larger than that of intra-firm imports. However, either knowledge transfer, β > 0, or
19I consider only the intensive margin of Koreans in management positions and intra-firm imports
because the logarithm of zero values for variables is dropped based on the model’s prediction.
However, only 555 and 888 affiliates among 3,908 affiliates experienced extensive margin changes
for Koreans in management positions and intra-firm imports, respectively. I also report a different
specification to estimate using the whole sample in Appendix A.3 to do a robustness check, but my
results are not different.
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Table 1.10: Effect of Physical Trades within MNCs on Labor Productivity
Dependent Variable: log(Labor Productivity)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Korean managers
Total managers
) 0.383*** 0.379*** 0.389*** 0.390*** 0.391*** 0.392***
[0.045] [0.056] [0.041] [0.042] [0.045] [0.038]
log( Total managers
Total employees
) 0.484*** 0.467*** 0.474*** 0.504*** 0.482*** 0.488***
[0.050] [0.065] [0.046] [0.046] [0.051] [0.042]
log( Intra−firm import
Total purchase
) 0.082***
[0.023]
log( Intra−firm export
Total sale
) -0.043**
[0.020]
log( Intra−firm export+import
Total sale+purchase
) -0.034
[0.029]
log( Intra−family import
Total purchase
) 0.036
[0.023]
log( Intra−family export
Total sale
) -0.022
[0.017]
log( Intra−family export+import
Total sale+purchase
) -0.062**
[0.027]
Observations 5,168 3,709 5,912 5,904 4,994 6,661
R-squared 0.242 0.216 0.224 0.237 0.218 0.219
Number of Affiliates 2,047 1,552 2,309 2,363 2,077 2,589
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I control for affiliate fixed-effect, country and time fixed-effect, country fixed-effect, industry
fixed-effect and time fixed-effect using dummy variables. I also control for multinational and time
fixed-effect using the sum of total sales of affiliates in the same MNC. I consider only the effects
of intra-firm and intra-family trades on the intensive margin. So, observations for each column are
different depending on the number of Korean foreign affiliates that were involved in intra-firm and
family trades.
better input for management positions, β = 0 and α > 1, through managers from
the parent can support the result. So, to examine the characteristics of managers
from the parent, I determine how their share changes as affiliates become larger.
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1.4.2 Determinants of Managers from the Parent
From Corollary 1 in the previous section, the number of managers from the parent
for a foreign affiliate would be limited under certain conditions. Figure 1.5 shows the
cumulative distribution of Korean foreign affiliates with respect to the number of
managers. The cumulative distribution tells us that 90 percent of the affiliates had
ten or fewer Korean managers, while they had a relatively monotonic increase in the
numbers of native managers in 2010 as their size became larger. 20 Interestingly,
even though most Korean affiliates had Korean managers, they had only a few of
them, confirming the prediction from Corollary 1.
Figure 1.5: Cumulative Distribution of Affiliates with respect to the Number of
Managers
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Note: This is the cumulative distribution of the fraction of foreign affiliates with
respect to the number of Korean and native managers in 2010. On average, Korean
foreign affiliates had five Korean and 52 native managers in 2010.
Therefore, I expect that the number of Korean managers does not depend on the
relative size of the affiliate, while that of native managers does. The share of Koreans
20On average, a Korean affiliate had five Korean and 52 native managers.
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managers is expected to decrease in relation to the affiliate’s size. To test this, I
estimate the following equation.
KSamcit = βo + β1 · Sizeamcit + β2 ·Horizontalamcit +
+ β3 · ηmt + β4 · ηct + β5 · ηc + β6 · ηi + +β7 · ηt + amcit (1.7)
In equation 2.12, the dependent variable (KSamcit) is the share of Koreans in man-
agement positions. For explanatory variables, I first measure the size of the af-
filiates, Sizeamcit, by either their total sales or their total number of employees.
Horizontalamcit is the share of sales to third-party firms in the host country, which
measures how much an affiliate serves for the domestic market as the horizontal FDI
mode motivates.
I include variables to control for the parent-time (ηmt), country-time (ηct), country
(ηc), industry (ηi) fixed-effects. To control for the parent-time effect, I use total sales
of the MNCs. 21 For variables to control for country-time effects, I consider GDP,
GDP per capita and investment share of GDP per capita from the Penn World Table
7.1 from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012). To control for country effects, I also
determine the distance to Korea from CEPII, as documented in Mayer and Zignago
(2011). To consider the education level in the host country, I determine the average
attained years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2012). Finally, besides the distance,
to determine an accurate cost to send a Korean manager from Korea to the host
country, I use the Rules of Overseas Service Allowance of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade in Korea. 22 To control for the industry effect, I use the share of
21I cannot identify the parent but can only recognize whether affiliates share the same parent. So,
total sales of the parent in Korea is the sum of total sales of the Korean affiliates in my sample that
share the same parent only.
22Actually, many Korean MNCs refer to the rules to decide expatriate compensation. One ad-
vantage from using these is that I can get the cost of sending Korean managers for most countries.
These rules are constructed based on UN Living Costs and Employment Conditions Abroad.
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R&D expenditures over total sales from The Survey of Research and Development in
Korea, and I also include time-dummy variables to control for the time fixed-effects.
My dependent variable is the share, so it is censored below zero and above one.
Considering that, I use the Tobit model to estimate coefficients. Because not many
observations turn out to be censored, I also use OLS for a robustness check. 23 Table
1.11 reports the estimation result.
In Table 1.11, the first and second columns show the result that is estimated by
the Tobit model using a different measure of the size of the affiliates. The third
and fourth columns show the same result that is estimated by the OLS model for
the robustness check. In all columns, the dependent variable is the share of Korean
managers. As Table 1.11 shows, all columns’ results are very similar and robust. The
result implies some interesting consequences of sending Koreans to hold management
positions with the affiliates.
First, the result shows that the share of Koreans in management positions is neg-
atively associated with the size of the affiliate. If an affiliate has a positive exogenous
shock, z increases, and the firm’s optimal decision is to increase its output as well as
to use more inputs. Thus the negative coefficient means that to use more managers,
the affiliate keeps hiring managers from the host country rather than having man-
agers from the parent. This result is consistent with the model’s prediction in the
case when β > 0 and αw
n
wk
< 1, which means that managers from the parent are a less
efficient input for management positions than are managers from the host country,
but they transfer knowledge and increase productivity of each input, so the affiliate
has an incentive to hire a few of them. 24
There are two possible explanations why Korean managers from the parent are
23Among 10,170 observations, 868 are censored below zero and 1,115 are censored above one.
24As Figure 1.5 shows, 90 percent of Korean foreign affiliates had fewer than ten Korean managers
in 2010.
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Table 1.11: Determinant of the Share of Koreans in Management Positions
Dependent Variable: The Share of KoreanManagers
Tobit OLS
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Total sale) -0.011*** -0.013***
[0.003] [0.002]
log(Total employee) -0.046*** -0.043***
[0.003] [0.002]
Sale to the domestic
Total sale
-0.050*** -0.073*** -0.039*** -0.061***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
log(Total sale of the MNC) -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
log(Distance) 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.026***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
log(R&D intensity) -0.020*** -0.008** -0.016*** -0.006
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
log(GDP per capita) 0.030** -0.016 0.032*** -0.012
[0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009]
log(GDP ) -0.006* -0.004 -0.005* -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
log(Schooling) 0.029 0.054 0.016 0.040
[0.040] [0.039] [0.032] [0.032]
log(Cost of dispatchment) -0.034 -0.066** 0.001 -0.026
[0.031] [0.030] [0.025] [0.024]
log(Capital Intensity) 0.037* 0.019 0.022 0.005
[0.022] [0.022] [0.018] [0.018]
Observations 10,347 10,347 10,347 10,347
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.11
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I control for year-fixed effect. The dependent variable is the share of
Korean managers. The first two columns show the results from Tobit, and the
other two columns show those from OLS. Among 11,254 foreign affiliates, 838
foreign affiliates have no managers. I drop 907 affiliates lacking income or schooling
data.
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a less efficient input than managers from the host country. The first explanation is
that α is smaller than one, which means that Korean managers are less productive
than native managers without regarding the cost. In fact, most production workers
are natives of the host country in the data. In 2010, at the aggregate level, only one
percent of production workers were Koreans and, on the extensive margin, more
than 70 percent of Korean foreign affiliates had zero Korean production workers
and all native production workers. Therefore, even in a developing country, where
the supply of labor with managerial skills is lower, Korean managers could be less
productive than native managers in managing native production workers. The second
explanation is that the cost of sending Korean managers is much higher than that of
hiring native managers, wk > wn. According to Mercer’s 2008 survey, expatriates at
the management level in Singapore were paid, on average, 2.6 times more because of
accommodations, mobility premium, education or other factors.
Another interesting finding from the results in Table 1.11 is that Horizontalamcit,
which measures how much the firm serves its domestic market, is negatively associated
with the share of Korean managers over total managers. If an affiliate is to target the
domestic market, understanding the circumstances of the domestic situation is very
important to maximizing its profit. Using U.S. MNCs, empirically, Oldenski (2012)
shows that products requiring direct communication with domestic consumers are
likely to be produced in the destination market through FDI instead of by arms-length
export. My result shows that even after FDI decisions, an affiliate still adjusts its
hiring of managers to fulfill the communication requirement. In line with Oldenski’s
result, I can claim that Korean managers from the parent have relatively more firm-
specific knowledge, which the MNC already holds, but native managers from the
domestic market have relatively more host-country-specific knowledge.
The results can also show that a parent that has more multinational activities,
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measured as total sales of the all affiliates, is likely to have a relatively smaller share
of Korean managers. However, as an affiliate operates in a country that is farther
away from Korea, the affiliate holds a relatively higher share of Koreans in manage-
ment positions. These two results can be interpreted in the following way. As an
MNC becomes larger, it can transfer its own knowledge through managers more eas-
ily because it has the know-how to operate the other affiliates. Also, as the distance
from the parent increases, it becomes harder to transfer its own knowledge through
managers, and it needs to send relatively more Korean managers to transfer its own
knowledge. 25 I also note that an affiliate in an R&D-intense industry has fewer
Korean managers. This result is consistent with Keller and Yeaple (2013), who show
that if inputs that an affiliate uses most are highly dependent on non-codified knowl-
edge – that is, knowledge-intensive – the affiliate depends highly on physical trade
and is sensitive to trade costs. However, my result implies that although employees
from the parent may have specialized knowledge in areas such as marketing or oper-
ating know-how, they do not in R&D because affiliates in an R&D-intensive industry
have fewer Korean managers.
1.4.3 Time Variation of Number of Managers
In the previous section, I used a simple static model that did not consider how
the choice of managers changes over time. In this chapter, I examine how the number
of managers from the parent and from the host country changes over time. This has
an important implication. If the number of managers from either the parent or the
host country changes over time, I need to consider a dynamic property in the model
25This interpretation can be in a line with Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2009), Irarrazabal,
Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013) and Tintelnot (2012). They calibrate the transportability of intan-
gible assets and productivity within an MNC as a function of the distance between the parent and
the affiliates.
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relating to the choice of managers. Furthermore, if the number of managers from the
parent decreases, which means that managers from the parent are needed less over
time, it implies that there is spillover of firm-specific knowledge from managers from
the parent to managers from the host country. To check this, I estimate the following
equation.
M
j|j={k,n}
amcit = βo + β1 · Timet + β2 · Sizeamcit +
+ β3 · ηa + β4 · ηmt + β5 · ηct + β6 · ηc + β7 · ηi + β8 · ηt + amcit (1.8)
I assign Timet as one to six from 2005 to 2010, so it is different from the time
fixed-effect controlled for by a dummy variable for each year. I also control for affiliate
size effect by controlling for the affiliates’ total sales or total employees. To see the
time effects within the affiliates, I control for affiliate fixed-effect. I also control
unobservable effects of the affiliate, MNC, country, industry and time using affiliate,
MNC-time, country-time, country, industry and time fixed-effects, as I did in Section
1.4.2. Table 1.12 shows the estimation results.
The estimation results tell us that the number of Korean managers does not change
over time. Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficients of the Time variable for the
number of Korean managers are negative but statistically insignificant, and columns
(3) and (4) show that the coefficients of the Time variable for the number of native
managers are positive and statistically significant. However, I do not know when FDI
for an affiliate occurred and when the affiliate started its business or became a part
of the MNC. These results confirm, therefore, that the number of Korean managers
is stable at least in the short term six years, and knowledge diffusion from Korean
managers to native managers may happen very slowly or not at all.
In Table 1.12, I also reconfirm the result that the share of Korean managers
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Table 1.12: Change in the Number of Managers over Time
Dependent Variable: # of Managers
Korean Native
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Time -0.043 -0.060 0.380*** 0.343***
[0.069] [0.068] [0.013] [0.009]
log(Total Sale) 0.133*** 0.256***
[0.015] [0.029]
log(Total Employee) 0.275*** 0.546***
[0.008] [0.014]
Observations 11,254 11,254 11,254 11,254
R-squared 0.070 0.345 0.068 0.358
Number of Affiliates 3,880 3,880 3,880 3,880
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I control for affiliate fixed-effect, country and time fixed-effect, country fixed-effect indus-
try fixed-effect and time fixed-effect using dummy variables. I also control for multinational and
time fixed-effect using the sum of total sales of affiliates in the same MNC. I assign Time as one
to six from 2005 to 2010, so it is different from the time fixed-effect controlled for by a dummy
variable for each year. The dependent variable for the first two columns is the number of Korean
managers and for the other two columns is the number of native managers.
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decreases as the affiliate becomes larger. By comparing the coefficient of total sales
or total employees in Columns (1) and (3) or Columns (2) and (4), the number of
native managers increases more than two times that of Korean managers.
1.5 Conclusion
Using Korean MNCs’ foreign affiliates data from the EXIM, this paper answers,
empirically, the questions: What are the comparative advantages of being in an MNC
and, along the same lines, what is the benefit of receiving FDI ? I show the relative
importance of an MNC transfer of managers from the parent to the foreign affili-
ates via physical trade or production worker transfers within the MNC. Moreover,
by examining characteristics of managers from the parent in various dimensions, I
provide new evidence of transferring firm-specific knowledge within an MNC through
transferring managers, as well as a guide for future research on the gains of FDI and
multinationals.
From a theoretical perspective, my result suggests that manager transfers can re-
sult in a huge gain in welfare from FDI. The previous literature often presumes that
knowledge is transferred from a developed country to a less developed country. How-
ever, an MNC can transfer firm-specific knowledge to its foreign affiliates. Because
this knowledge is not held by a country, including developed countries, but held by
the MNC, it is possible that it can be beneficial to both developing and developed
countries. Thus, while it is clear that knowledge is transferred from developed to
developing countries, the reverse is also true. In the previous section, my estimation
results show that the effect of Korean managers on labor productivity in developed
countries is larger than that in developing countries. Furthermore, my empirical re-
sult shows that an MNC becomes better at transferring its firm-specific knowledge
to the affiliates at a lower cost as its size increases. The knowledge, therefore, can be
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replicable in multiple locations with lower costs.
From a policy perspective, my result emphasizes the importance of an environ-
ment in which expatriates can successfully put down roots in a host country. Most
government policies focus on tax benefits or financial subsides to attract FDI. My re-
sult demonstrates, however, that it is hard to transfer firm-specific knowledge, which
is a main gain from FDI, without manager transfers from the parent. Mervosh and
McClenahen (1997) estimate that the direct cost of a failed foreign assignment in a
U.S. multinational ranges from $250,000 to $500,000 and that half of all expatriates
fail to complete their assignment for various reasons, such as family or culture. So,
to achieve a gain from FDI or multinational affiliates, it is necessary to carry out a
policy to help expatriates settle in and work well with the foreign affiliate.
37
Chapter 2
SPECIALIZATION AND UNBALANCED SECTOR GROWTH
2.1 Introduction
A large literature in economic development has discussed the important role that
productivity in agriculture or services has for the growth of manufacturing and the
economy as whole. 1 However, empirical evidence from some Asian economies such
as Japan, Korea or China is inconsistent with this literature. These countries achieved
unprecedented growth in the manufacturing sector without a significant improvement
of productivity in other sectors. 2 This raises a question: is high productivity in the
other sectors necessary to achieving rapid manufacturing growth?
To answer this question, I provide an endogenous growth model with two sec-
tors. In one sector, manufacturing, heterogeneous firms grow endogenously by innova-
tion investment. The other sector, non-manufacturing, provides a non-manufacturing
good, which is a source of final good used for either the innovation investment or final
consumption. With the model, I consider two policy choices that exogenously expand
the output of the non-manufacturing good. The first exogenous change involves in-
creasing the productivity of the firm in the domestic non-manufacturing sector, the
structural transformation emphasized in the previous literature. The second change
1The literature highlights that increases of productivity in the agriculture sector are an essential
condition to reallocate labor from the agriculture sector to the manufacturing sector and to initiate
manufacturing sector growth on structural transformation. See Kuznets and Murphy (1966), Mat-
suyama (1992), Ko¨gel and Prskawetz (2001) and Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002). Moreover,
recent literatures also focus on productivity of the service sector, especially financial or business sup-
ports. See Francois (1990), Neusser and Kugler (1998), Francois and Hoekman (2010) and Kehoe
and Ruhl (2012)
2See Ito and Weinstein (1996) for Japan, Eichengreen, Perkins, and Shin (2012) for Korea and
Bosworth and Collins (2008) for China
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consists of expanding imports of the non-manufacturing good from a foreign country
which has higher productivity in the non-manufacturing sector. I then study how
these two exogenous changes affect innovation decision of firms and economic growth
in the manufacturing sector.
The model predicts that both exogenous policies increase welfare of the economy
due to the falling price of non-manufacturing good, but predicts contrary outcomes
in the manufacturing sector. When the economy imports more non-manufacturing
goods from foreign countries, firms in the manufacturing sector have an increased in-
centive to conduct innovation because of the lower price of non-manufacturing goods.
As their pace of productivity increases, labor moves from non-manufacturing to man-
ufacturing. On the other hand, when the policy entails increasing the productivity of
the domestic firm in the non-manufacturing sector, the productivity of the firms in
the manufacturing sector increases relatively slowly and can even decrease depend-
ing on parameters in the model. In this last case, labor can even shift from the
manufacturing sector to the non-manufacturing sector.
This consequence has an intuitive explanation. Both policy changes reduce the
price of the non-manufacturing good and give the firms in the manufacturing sector
more incentive for innovation. However, if the economy increases the productivity of
the firm in the non-manufacturing sector, this firm will hire more labor. Thus, this
change increases the demand for labor – and labor cost – throughout the economy.
The higher costs lower the profitability of firms in the manufacturing sector and
cause them to conduct less innovation. On the other hand, importing more non-
manufacturing goods benefits firms in the manufacturing sector through a lower price
for the non-manufacturing good but has no impact on labor costs. Thus, firms in the
manufacturing sector conduct more innovation and grow rapidly, causing the economy
to become specialized in the manufacturing sector.
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Table 2.1: Growth Rate of Labor Productivity from 1977-1988
Korea EU15 US
TOTAL INDUSTRIES 6.6% 2.4% 1.1%
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING 6.7% 6.0% 2.9%
MINING AND QUARRYING -0.3% 4.6% 2.0%
MANUFACTURING 8.9% 3.2% 2.7%
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY 11.8% 3.3% -0.2%
CONSTRUCTION 4.1% 1.7% -1.5%
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE 1.6% 1.9% 2.2%
HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 5.4% -0.9% 0.0%
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION 5.4% 3.3% 2.0%
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS SERVICES 1.9% 0.3% -1.0%
COMMUNITY SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES -0.3% 0.5% 0.1%
Note: I calculate growth rate of labor productivity using gross value-added per hour from EU KLEMS.
The motivation for this research is the experience of Asian economies such as
Japan, Korea or China. Each experienced unprecedented rapid economic growth
with lagging growth in non-manufacturing sectors. For instance, consider the pattern
of Korean economic growth. From 1977 to 1988, Korean total labor productivity
increased by 6.6% yearly, while total labor productivity in the manufacturing sector
increased by 8.9% yearly and that in other sectors stagnated. 3 Even compared to
the respective sectoral growth rates of the EU and US during the same time period,
the manufacturing sector in Korea grew faster but the other sectors did not. The
growth miracle in Japan, which experienced rapid growth before Korea, also had the
similar pattern. Ito and Weinstein (1996) show that the primary source of Japan’s
rapid growth was the high rate of productivity growth in the manufacturing sector
and the shift of resources to the manufacturing sector is observable during the rapid
growth period.
3I choose this period because the share of Korean labor in the manufacturing sector increased
until 1988. Extending the time period to 1970 does not affect the conclusion. Except for Electricity,
gas and water supply. However, this sector has only small share of the total economy.
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Consistent with my modeling framework, I also observe a significant increase in
imports of non-manufacturing goods during the same period in Korea. From 1977 to
1988, imports of agriculture and raw materials increased by 16.8% yearly and those of
services increased by 18.5% yearly. 4 Apparently, the economy imported more goods
from those sectors, the non-manufacturing sector, where domestic production grew
slowly. These facts suggest that “unbalanced growth” occurred due to specialization
according to comparative advantage, but not “balanced growth” where all sectors
of the economy improved simultaneously. 5 It is also different from the pattern
experienced by the developed countries during their structural transformation.
I also use the model to conduct several numerical experiments. I obtain three
findings with implications for development of a country. First, I show that allow-
ing the import of more non-manufacturing goods from abroad makes firms in the
manufacturing sectors grow more rapidly than increasing the productivity of the
non-manufacturing sector quantitatively. Second, I show that the growth of the man-
ufacturing sector is slower with higher productivity in the non-manufacturing sector
when the economy allows imports more non-manufacturing goods. Lastly, I find that
a larger economy has a greater welfare increase from a policy that focuses on increas-
ing the domestic productivity of the non-manufacturing sector and developing both
sectors in tandem.
Our research is related to previous works in economic growth and development.
Specifically, it is in line with the development literature that attempts to explain
how a country initiates manufacturing sector growth and the role of other sectors in
that process. Matsuyama (1992), Ko¨gel and Prskawetz (2001) and Gollin, Parente,
4World Development Indicator
5I use terminology balanced and unbalanced growth from Rauch (1997). In an economy which
has two sectors, Rauch (1997) named ”balanced growth” if both sectors have the same growth rates
and ”unbalanced growth” if not.
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and Rogerson (2002) emphasize the importance of the productivity of the agricul-
ture sector letting labor or other resource be transferred to the manufacturing sector.
Moreover, other literature such as Francois (1990), Neusser and Kugler (1998), Fran-
cois and Hoekman (2010) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2012) emphasize the importance of
productivity in the service sector, such as providing financial or business services, as
intermediates for manufacturing. While the previous works consider the productivity
of non-manufacturing sector as the only determinant of producing non-manufacturing
goods, I consider the additional alternative of providing non-manufacturing goods
that are imported with better technology.
Our work is also related to a broad range of the endogenous growth literature
that incorporates endogenous R&D decision driving economy growth as in Romer
(1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1993). The success
of innovation is stochastic as in Griliches (1979) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). I
incorporate endogenous innovation decisions of firms in the manufacturing sector
similar to Klette and Kortum (2004), Lentz and Mortensen (2008) and Atkeson and
Burstein (2010). Finally, the model is closely related to that of Atkeson and Burstein
(2010) which has firm-level innovation decisions. While they consider symmetric
countries to focus on gains from trade, I focus on growth of a developing country by
considering an asymmetric case with a small open economy. In my model, since it
has two industries, specialization is a key mechanism to evaluate the effects of two
policy changes.
A recent work by Gersbach, Schneider, and Schneller (2013) evaluates the effect
of similar policies. They argue that if an economy imports leading technology from
foreign countries instead of public research investment, then the economy has a lower
level of domestic innovation. This seems to be opposite to my main results. However,
in their work, openness to foreign technology discourages optimal domestic innovation
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because foreign technology substitutes domestic technology. In my model, however,
there are two sectors and openness to foreign technology means that an economy
imports more non-manufacturing good. This foreign non-manufacturing good as a
pars of research goods complements innovations in the manufacturing sector. This
difference results in the opposite consequence 6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the
two sector growth model where firms in the manufacturing sector grow endogenously
and the non-manufacturing sector provides parts of research goods for firms in the
manufacturing sector to innovate. In section 2.3, I demonstrate how the two policies
result in different consequences, especially in the manufacturing sector. In section
2.4, I conduct some experiments using the model and provide some implications for
the development path of different countries. Section 2.5 is the conclusion.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Environment
I consider a small open economy being surrounded by one continent. The economy
has two sectors called manufacturing and non-manufacturing respectively. I assume
that goods in manufacturing are perfectly tradable but goods in non-manufacturing
are partly tradable. In the manufacturing sector, there are heterogeneous firms in
terms of productivity and they can grow endogenously by investing in R&D while
there is a homogeneous firm with a productivity in the non-manufacturing sector. 7
6While I focus on endogenous growth in manufacturing related to productivity in the non man-
ufacturing sector in a developing country, Gersbach, Schneider, and Schneller (2013) understand
domestic optimal innovation with an option to adopt foreign technology in a developed country.
7I am particularly interested in the growth miracle in East Asian countries. Sachs and Warner
(1995) emphasizes that if a country is not endowed with natural resources like some East Asian
economies, then it does not have comparative advantage. In the economy, export firms in the
manufacturing lead an economic growth.
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There is a measure L of infinitely lived homogeneous household in the economy who
only values his consumption and is endowed with one unit of labor.
2.2.2 Manufacturing sector
There are a continum number of varieties between 0 and N·K in the manufacturing
sector, indexed by i. In each variety i, there is only one firm, either a domestic firm,
or a foreign firm. A firm is the only monopolist for its own variety, but engages in
monopolistic competition with firms producing other varieties.
There are two possible state for a firm’s productivity for each variety, indexed
by zL and zH . The firm with productivity index z, has labor productivity exp(z)
1
σ−1 .
The firm uses labor l as its only input. The firm’s output is the following production
technology,
xi = (e
zi)
1
σ−1 li (2.1)
Each output from firms in the manufacturing sector is aggregated by combining
with other varieties in the same sector. I call the good which is aggregated by all
varieties from the manufacturing sector as manufacturing good. There is no trade cost
for the manufacturing good and it can be used both domestically and internationally.
Therefore, the aggregation function for the manufacturing good is following.
M = (
∫ N
0
xi
σ−1
σ di+
∫ NK
N
xi
σ−1
σ di)
σ
σ−1 (2.2)
The small open economy produces variety from (0, N ] domestically while foreign
firms produces varieties from (N,NK]. 8
8In this framework, K →∞ imply that the economy is a small open economy
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Innovation of the Firm
A Firm in the manufacturing sector can grow endogenously by conducting research
and development investment for their future productivity. The final goods Y is used
as the input for such investment. If a firm spends c(q) for the innovation where c(·)
is second-order differential and it satisfies that c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) > 0, regardless
whatever his productivity is today, his productivity z′ tomorrow would be
z′ =

zH with probability q
zL with probability 1− q
(2.3)
Manufacturing firm’s problem
The objective of the firm is maximizing its value determined by the sum of current
and future values. From the assumption of small open economy, each individual firm
takes total market size for the manufacturing sector denoted by M and the world
price for manufacturing good, PM as given. Since I do not have entry and exit in the
model, the mass of domestic firms is fixed as N . 9
firm with productivity index z can be solved by the following recursive problem.
V (z) = max
p,l
p ∗ exp(z) 1σ−1 l − ωl − c(q) + β[qV (zH) + (1− q)V (zL)] (2.4)
s.t.
D(p, pM ,M) = exp(z)
1
σ−1 l (2.5)
where D(·) is demand for the firm from the final manufacturing sector that I will
define later. p · exp(z) 1σ−1 l − ωl is the profit determine the firm’s current value, c(q)
9The main goal of the paper is not to analyze a change of the number of firms but growth in size of
incumbent firms. If I allow the free entry condition to determine the number of firms endogenously,
I can have different size of the manufacturing sector instead of those of individual firms’ growth
patterns.
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is the amount of R&D investment the firm conducts, and qV (zH) + (1− q)V (zL) will
be the expected firm value in the future, which is discounted at rate β.
2.2.3 Non-manufacturing sector
The non-manufacturing sector is operated by perfectly competitive producers and
perferctly competitive aggregators. A representative firm in the non-manufacturing
sector uses labor with constant return to scale production technology to produce
non-manufacturing output.
The production function of the firm in the non-manufacturing is:
SD = θLS (2.6)
Where SD is the total non-manufacturing good provided by the domestic firm,
while LS is the total labor engaged in the non-manufacturing good production. I
normalize the productivity of the firm as one in the continent, and let θ be the
productivity of the domestic firm in the non-manufacturing sector, where θ < 1.
Since the non-manufacturing sector is partially tradable, some of the foreign
non-manufacturing goods are also available in the domestic market. However, the
imported non-manufacturing goods and domestic non-manufacturing goods are not
perfect substitutes. The elasticity of substitution between the two types of non man-
ufacturing goods is ρ.
There is the final non-manufacturing goods producers by aggregating non-manufacturing
good from both domestic and foreign. And both domestic and foreign non-manufacturing
goods are aggregated into final non-manufacturing good via the following function,
S = (λ
1
ρS
ρ−1
ρ
F + (1− λ)
1
ρS
ρ−1
ρ
D )
ρ
ρ−1 (2.7)
SF is the imported non-manufacturing goods, and SD is domestically provided
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non-manufacturing goods.
Here θ and λ are the parameters which relate to productivity of the non-manufacturing
sector. I am interested in two exogenous changes in these parameters. If θ increases
and productivity of the domestic non-manufacturing sector becomes more produc-
tive, the economy provides more non-manufacturing goods from the domestic and SF
becomes higher in the equilibrium. In the other hand, if λ increases which I consider
a case where the non-manufacturing market becomes more accessible to foreign firms.
Then, SF becomes lower in the equilibrium.
2.2.4 Final Good Sector
The final good producers are perfect competitive producers who use manufacturing
goods bundle (Mc) and non-manufacturing goods bundles (S) and aggregate it in to
the final output. They take the price of manufacturing goods bundle PM , and the
price of non-manufacturing goods bundle PS as given.
The production function of final good production is take as follows:
Y = Mαc S
1−α (2.8)
The final output is used in consumption and making R&D investments.
2.2.5 Households
A stand-in consumer is endowed with L unit of labor each period. He derives
utility from the final good consumption, and chooses consumption allocations {ct},
t = 0, 1, ..., to maximize lifetime utility.
max
∑
βt logCt (2.9)
subject to the budget constraints∑
ptPt(Ct) ≤
∑
pt(ωtL+ E(dt)), t = 0, 1, ... (2.10)
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Here, pt is the Arrow-Debru price, Pt is the price of final good, ωt is the wage rate,
and E(dt) =
∫ N
0
pi ∗exp(zi) 1σ−1 li−ωli−c(qi)dµ(i) is the expected dividend from firms
in the manufacturing sector.
The consumer does not value leisure in my model, so he devotes all his labor en-
dowment into the production. On the other hand, the consumer does not accumulate
any capital, so he consumes the exactly same amount of consumption goods for each
period following the permanent income hypothesis.
2.2.6 Equilibrium
A stationary recursive equilibrium is a list of aggregate state variables, the dis-
tribution of firms’ productivity {µ(z) }, and individual state variables, (zi), for each
firm in the manufacturing sector,
a list of prices:
P (µ(z)), ω(µ(z)), pi(z, µ(z))
and a list of decision functions:
a) V (z, µ(z)) ,d(z, µ(z)), l(z, µ(z)) , x(z, µ(z)), q(z, µ(z)) for a manufacturing firm
b) SSD(µ(z)), LS(µ(z)) for a non-manufacturing firm
c) SS(µ(z)) , SF (µ(z)),S
D
D (µ(z)) for a non-manufacturing aggregator
d) Y (µ(z)), Mc(µ(z)), S
D(µ(z)), for a final aggregator
e) c(µ(z))
and an updating rule for the state variables:
z′ =

zH with probability q
zL with probability 1− q
µ(z) = H(µ(z))
such that
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1) The consumer takes the wage as given, the future dividend, and the other
prices. He maximizes his life time utility by having his consumption equal to his
life-time income.
2) Firms in the manufacturing sector take the demand function and the wage as
given, choose d(z, µ(z)), l(z, µ(z)) and innovation intensity q(z, µ(z)) that maximize
the value of this firm V (z, µ(z))
3) The firm in the non-manufacturing sector takes prices as given and produces
SSD(µ(z)), domestic non-manufacturing goods, to maximize its profit using LS(µ(z)).
4) The non-manufacturing aggregator takes prices as given and it produces final
non-manufacturing goods, SS(µ(z)), using SF (µ(z)) and S
D
D (µ(z)) as inputs.
5) The final aggregator takes prices as given and it produces final output, Y (µ(z))
using SD(µ(z)) as inputs.
6) How to aggregate each good is consistent to the updating rule of µ(z)
7) All market clearings and the trade balance conditions hold.
2.2.7 Equilibrium Results
2.2.8 Non-Manufacturing sector:
Since the non-manufacturing sector is perfectly competitive, the price of the non-
manufacturing good will be equal to the firm’s marginal unit cost:
PN = W/θ (2.11)
The non-manufacturing aggregater combines both domestic and foreign non-manufacturing
goods into final non-manufacturing goods under a CES technology. In the equilib-
rium, its unit cost of producing non-manufacturing goods will be:
PS = (λP
∗1−ρ
T + (1− λ)P 1−ρN )
1
1−ρ (2.12)
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which equals to the equilibrium price for the non-manufacturing goods.
Then the demand for domestic non-manufacturing inputs should satisfy:
PNSN = (1− λ)(PN
PS
)−(ρ−1)PSS (2.13)
which equals the total amount of the wage paid to the workers in the domestic non-
manufacturing sectors, ωLN
On the other hand, the total amount of non-manufacturing goods from a foreign
country is
P ∗TST = λ(
P ∗T
PS
)−(ρ−1)PSS (2.14)
2.2.9 Manufacturing sector
A firm with productivity z in the manufacturing sector maximizes its profit under
the monopolistic competition, given the world market size for manufacturing goods,
M .
In the equilibrium, the demand for labor in manufacturing firms with productivity
index z will be:
l(z) = (
σ
σ − 1)
−σ(
ω
PM
)−σM exp(zH) (2.15)
And its profit will be:
pi(z) =
P σMMω
1−σ
σσ(σ − 1)1−σ exp(z) (2.16)
The innovation cost function is c(q) = Pheq. Let pi =
PσMM
σσ(σ−1)1−σ for simplicity in
writing. In the equilibrium, the value function of a manufacturing industry firm is:
V (zL) = piω
1−σ(C1 + C2(lnpi(ω)− ln(P ))) (2.17)
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10
V (zH) = V (zL) + pi(zH)− pi(zL) (2.18)
The optimal innovation cost c(q) = β(1− δ)[pi(AH)− pi(AL)] and the optimal q is
q = ln(piβ(1− δ)[exp(zH)− exp(zL)]/h) + (1− σ) lnω − lnP (2.19)
2.2.10 Final Aggregation sector
Since the production function is Cobb-Douglas and the final good sector is per-
fectly competitive, the two first order condition gives the equilibrium demand for
manufacturing goods and non-manufacturing goods:
PMMc
PSSD
=
α
1− α (2.20)
And correspondingly, the equilibrium price of the final goods will be
P =
PαMP
1−α
S
αα(1−α)(1−α) (2.21)
2.2.11 Market Clearing
The labor demand for the manufacturing sector and the non manufacturing sector
are
LM = N(
σ
σ − 1)
−σ(
ω
PM
)−σM(µ exp(zH) + (1− µ) exp(zL)) (2.22)
LN = (1− α)( λ
1− λP
∗1−ρ
T (
ω
θ
)ρ−1 + 1)−1(L+
N
ω
(µd(zH) + (1− µ)d(zL))) (2.23)
LM + LN equals to the labor supply, LS = L.
The final good market is cleared for each period:
PC = ωL+N(µpiH + (1− µ)piL − β(1− δ)[piH − piL]) (2.24)
10Where C1 =
exp(zL)+β(1−δ)[exp(zH)−exp(zL)](ln(β(1−δ)[exp(zH)−exp(zL)]/h)−1)
(1−β(1−δ)) and C2 =
β(1−δ)[exp(zH)−exp(zL)]
(1−β(1−δ))
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From the trade balance condition,
P (Y − C) = λ(P
∗
T
PS
)−(ρ−1)PSS (2.25)
Proposition 3. There exists a unique stationary recursive equilibrium in the model.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.3 Comparative Statics for Parameter θ and λ
The model equilibrium is characterized by the equilibrium wage and prices. Since
the unique equilibrium exsits in the model, I conduct comparative analysis by altering
parameters θ and λ and see how the equilibrium responds.
As I discussed before, a higher λ means the economy is allowed to import more
non-manufacturing goods from a foreign country. Otherwise, higher θ means the
economy has higher productivity in the non manufacturing sector. Both changes
are favorable to a firm’s innovation in the manufacturing sector because the changes
provide cheaper non-manufacturing goods and finally they reduce costs of innovation.
Since the equilibrium (ω∗, P ∗) is characterized by the market clearing for the final
goods and labor. The equilibrium condition gives,
P = (
PM
α
)α(
PS
1− α)
1−α (2.26)
PS = ((1− λ)(ω
θ
)1−ρ + λP ∗1−ρT )
1
1−ρ (2.27)
I rewrite the market clearing condition for the final goods as
P ∗ = P ∗(ω, θ, λ) (2.28)
and substitute it into the market clearing condition for labor. Then the equilibrium
ω∗ satisfies
LM(ω
∗, P ∗(ω∗, θ, λ), θ, λ) + LN(ω∗, P ∗(ω∗, θ, λ), θ, λ)− LS = 0 (2.29)
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Let ν(ω, θ, λ) be the wedge between the demand and supply of the labor:
ν(ω, θ, λ) = LM(ω, P
∗(ω, θ, λ), θ, λ) + LN(ω, P ∗(ω, θ, λ), θ, λ)− LS (2.30)
I take first order derivatives of the wedge equation with respect to ω, θ and λ Because
∂LM
∂P
, ∂LN
∂P
, ∂LN
∂λ
, ∂P
∂λ
, ∂P
∂θ
are negative and ∂P
∂ω
, ∂LN
∂θ
are positive in the equilibrium.
∂ν
∂ω
=
∂LM
∂P
∂P
∂ω
+
∂LN
∂P
∂P
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
IndirectEffect	
+
∂LN
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
IndirectEffect	
+
∂LM
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
DirectEffect	
(2.31)
∂ν
∂λ
=
∂P
∂λ
(
∂LM
∂P
+
∂LN
∂P
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IndirectEffect⊕
+
∂LN
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
DirectEffect	
(2.32)
∂ν
∂θ
=
∂P
∂θ
(
∂LM
∂P
+
∂LN
∂P
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IndirectEffect⊕
+
∂LN
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
DirectEffect⊕
(2.33)
The indirect effect comes from changes in prices. Because an economy can ei-
ther import more non-manufacturing goods from a foreign country or produce non-
manufacturing goods with a higher productivity, it can use cheaper non-manufacturing
goods which reduce the final goods and innovation costs. So firms in the manufac-
turing sector grows and attract labor.
The direct effect of the two possible parameter changes moves the equilibrium in
opposite directions. When the economy can import more non-manufacturing goods
from a foreign country, domestic non manufacturing goods are replaced by the foreign
non manufacturing goods. Then the labor demand of the non-manufacturing sector
decreases and there is surplus of the labor from the non-manufacturing sector. On the
other hand, when the economy increases productivity of the non manufacturing sector,
the labor demand of the non-manufacturing sector increases and there is shortage of
labor.
From the three equations above, the implicit function theorem tells us that
∂ω∗
∂λ
= −
∂ν
∂λ
∂ν
∂ω
: sign unknown (2.34)
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∂ω∗
∂θ
= −
∂ν
∂θ
∂ν
∂ω
> 0 (2.35)
I do the same thing for P ∗ as rewriting the market clearing condition for the final
good. I plug the market clearing condition rewritten into ω(P, θ, λ) and substitute it
into the market clearing condition for labor. Then I can show
∂P ∗
∂λ
= −
∂ψ
∂λ
∂ψ
∂P
< 0 (2.36)
∂P ∗
∂θ
= −
∂ψ
∂θ
∂ψ
∂P
: sign unknown (2.37)
Similarly to the case of wage, I argue that when an economy imports more non-
manufacturing goods, an increase in λ, both the direct effect and the indirect effect
move in the same way to bring down the price. But the effect of an increase of θ is
ambiguous.
Lemma 1. If ρ→∞, there is a pair of (θ, λ) satisfying ∂ω∗
∂λ
= 0 and ∂P
∗
∂θ
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4. If ρ→∞ and a pair of (θ,λ) satisfies ∂ω∗
∂λ
= 0 and ∂P
∗
∂θ
= 0, increases
in θ and λ both increase the welfare of the economy, but the effect on productivity and
labor in the manufacturing sector is opposite.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
2.4.1 Extended Model for Simulation
In this section, I extend the baseline model to an infinite number of possible
productivity for firms in the manufacturing sector in order to conduct quantitative
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Table 2.2: Parameters of the Model for the Simulations
Parameter Description Value
PM The final good price level 0.85
PT Price level of continent non-manufacturing goods 1
M The world market size for manufacturing intermediate goods 10
N Measure of domestic manufacturing firms 10
K Measure of total manufacturing firm unnecessary
12
L Total domestic labor force 100000
β Discount rate 0.96
δ Exogenous quit rate 0.005
α Manufacturing share 0.3
ρ Elasticity of substitution between service goods 10
σ Elasticity of substitution between manufacturing goods 5
∆ Step Length for innovation 0.1
θ Productivity of the firm in the domestic non-manufacturing sector
λ Parameter to determine the weight for foreign non-manufacturing goods
13
analysis. Following Atkeson and Burstein (2010), a firm in the manufacturing sector
invests C(q, z) = Pheqez units of final output to do the innovation. Then it will get
the following innovation outcomes:
z′ =

z + ∆ with probability q
z −∆ with probability 1− q
(2.38)
exp(∆) is the productivity difference between the two adjacent productivity indexes.
Now µ(z) is the distribution of infinite possible productivity indexes so I can define
the a equilibrium as what I have done in the Section 2.2.
For conducting some simulation results, I parmeterize the model. I provide each
value of the parameters which I use in Table 2. 11
11My goal is not to give an accurate quantitative analysis for policies but to give implications
about different policies. So I do not calibrate the parameters precisely
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2.4.2 Simulation Analysis
Using the extended model, I will conduct some counterfactual analysis. I especially
focus on two exogenous changes of λ and θ. Both changes provide lower prices of
non-manufacturing goods but, as I studied before, the impact on the manufacturing
sectors is different. First, I show how λ and θ affects innovation decisions of firms in
the manufacturing sectors which provided theoretical results with the simple model
before. This analysis will tell us the growth pattern from different policies. Second,
I show the effect of a change of λ given different level of θ. This result will tell us
how much specialization will benefit on economics depending on different levels of
development in the non-manufacturing sector. Finally, I show that how the size of
an economy matters for the effects of two exogenous changes.
Experiment 1. Effects of two policies on the distribution of the manufacturing sector
In Experiment 1, I show Proposition 2 quantitatively with heterogeneity in firms’
productivity but with multiple productivity levels using the extended model. For the
experiment, I start from a specific (θ, λ) pair as (0.1, 0.1). I do not construct an
explicit cost function for the two policies. To consider changes of the two policies
comparably, first I change θ to 0.3 and calculate the change of household’s welfare.
From the change of household’s welfare, I find the change of λ which guarantees the
same change of the household’s welfare, λ = 0.247. So I compare each change of the
two policies which increase θ from 0.1 to 0.3 and λ from 0.1 to 0.247. I provide the
probability density function for productivity of the firms after two policies in Figure
1.
The Figure 1 says that the increase in λ has a favorable change for a firms’ inno-
vation in the manufacturing sector rather than an increase in θ. In the experiment,
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Firm’s Productivity after Increases in θ and λ
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the increase in λ has a higher fraction of firms with an increase in productivity and
a lower fraction of firms with lower productivity ex-post. On the other hand, the
increase in θ even makes firms ex-post have lower productivity than before the policy
change. I calculate the change of average productivity of the firms in the manufactur-
ing sectoe using
∫ N
0
ziµ(z)dz. Although both changes were designed to give the same
change in the welfare, the change of the λ increases the firms’ average productivity by
4 percent while that of the θ decreases the productivity by 34 percent. About labor
movement, two changes give opposite result. The change of the λ make the firms in
the manufacturing hire more labor by 0.9 percent while that of the θ make the firm
hire only less than half of labor.
The quantitative result is consistent with Proposition 2 in Section 2.2 which is
the analytic result with two possible productivity levels. As I explained in the model,
this is related to specialization. Because of a lower price of non-manufacturing goods,
both parameter changes give a higher incentive to conduct innovation. However,
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an increase in λ makes firms in the manufacturing sector suffer from a relatively
small increase in the labor cost because there is no change of productivity of the
firm in the non-manufacturing sector. The firms in the manufacturing sector have
higher profits and conduct more innovation compared to an increase in θ. Then, the
economy becomes specialized in the manufacturing sector without improvement of
the non-manufacturing sector.
Experiment 2. Effects of λ increase on the manufacturing sector in different θs
For Experiment 2, I start from two different fairs (θ, λ) as (0.3, 0.1) and (0.5, 0.1)
, then I increase λ to 0.3. As I show firm‘s productivity distribution in Figure 2, the
increase in λ is likely to drive a more rapid growth in the manufacturing sector with
a lower θ. It happens because a higher productivity of the non-manufacturing sector
make the equilibrium price of the labor service higher then decreases profits of firms
in the manufacturing sector as well as incentive of innovation of them. Openness in
the non-manufacturing sector, therefore, is less desirable when a country already has
a high non-manufacturing productivity. Reversely, a country which has low produc-
tivity in non-manufacturing finds it necessary to import more goods for growth in the
manufacturing sector.
Quantitatively, the change of the lambda from 0.1 to 0.3 will give 17 percent
increases the average productivity of the firms in the manufacturing sector with θ =
0.3 while the same change increases the productivity only by 1.4 percent with θ = 0.5.
And also, the first change makes the firms in the manufacturing sector hire much more
labor than the second one, by 40 percent and 11 percent respectively.
The result implies that when a country has very low productivity across all in-
dustries, the manufacturing sector takes comparative advantage through opening the
non-manufacturing sector, the county experiences rapid growth and specializes in
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Firm’s Productivity after Increases in λ on Different θs
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the manufacturing sector as in the case of the growth miracle economies in Asia.
However, a country that has relatively higher productivity in the non-manufacturing
sector or when a country’s income increases due to higher productivity in the non-
manufacturing sector then the comparative advantage disappears. This can explain
why a developing country can have firms which grow extremely rapidly in the manu-
facturing sector compared to those in a developed country.
Experiment 3. Effect of θ and λ on the welfare for the household by different num-
bers of labor.
In Experiment 3, I show different impacts on the policy depending on different sizes
of countries. I start from a specific (θ, λ) pair as (0.1, 0.1). I increase θ to 0.3 and
then try finding each level of λ to give the same change in the welfare of the household
by different number of labor. This implies that I implicitly find out λ which provides
the same benefit as the change of the increase θ by 0.3 by different sizes of economy.
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Figure 3: Relation between λ and Number of Labor
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As I show in Figure 3, if I have more labor, I need a higher λ to get the same welfare
gain from the change of the same θ. Similarly, a larger country, which has more labor,
will have a smaller welfare gain from the same change of λ which allows IT to import
more non-manufacturing goods than a smaller country.
The result provides an implication that a larger country will get a rapid growth in
the manufacturing sector through specialization in the sector. However, in terms of
welfare gain, the gain from the openness for the non-manufacturing sector relative to
increasing its own productivity in the non-manufacturing sector is smaller because of
its size. This tells us that a balanced growth through increasing productivity of the
non-manufacturing sector as well would be a necessary policy if the country is larger.
Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2012) analyze historical growth experiences of coun-
tries and they argue that a country experiences a slowdown of economic growth when
per capita GDP of the country reaches $13, 000 named ’Middle income trap’. To
avoid ’Middle income trap’ they emphasize an increase in productivity in the non-
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manufacturing sector. From historical analysis of other countries, They also argue
that China will be in the trap when its income level reaches to $13, 000. However, my
model suggests that it is necessary to increase productivity of the non-manufacturing
sector even if it has a lower income level than other countries in terms of welfare
because China is much bigger than other countries.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide a model with two sectors where the manufacturing sector
grows endogenously and the non-manufacturing sector provide goods used for both
research and final consumption stimulating innovation of firms in the manufactur-
ing sector. Using the model, I examine the effects of two exogenous changes that
expand the output of goods in the non-manufacturing sector. The first policy is to
increase domestic productivity in the non-manufacturing sector by itself and the other
is to import more non-manufacturing goods from a foreign country that has higher
productivity. Even though both changes increase the welfare of the economy, both
theoretically and quantitatively, I show that effects on the manufacturing sector are
different. Our model predicts that the latter change makes firms in the manufac-
turing sector grow faster and attracts more labor to the manufacturing sector than
the former. Based on my result, I argue that the specialization through importing
non-manufacturing goods contributes to Asian economic growth but not increasing
productivity in the non-manufacturing sector emphasized in previous literature on
structural transformation.
I also conduct some experiments using the model and provide interesting insight
for economic development. Our experiments suggest that the growth of manufac-
turing is slower with higher productivity in the non-manufacturing sector when the
economy allows imports more non-manufacturing goods. This implies that in terms of
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growth of manufacturing a developing country has more incentive to be specialized in
manufacturing through importing more non-manufacturing goods than a developed
country does because it has a lower productivity in the non-manufacturing sector.
Furthermore, a larger economy has a larger welfare gain from increasing the domestic
productivity of non-manufacturing sector and developing both sector in a balanced
way. This result has an important implication for growth of the Chinese economy.
The similar pattern of economic growth to that of Japan or Korea could guarantee
the fast growth of Chinese manufacturing. 14 In terms of welfare, however, China
might have a lower welfare improving relative to that of Japan and Korea’s growth
experiences because China is much larger than the other countries.
14Bosworth and Collins (2008) show, using the growth accounting, that productivity of the indus-
try sector including manufacturing, utility and construction has increased by 6.1% while those of
agriculture and service sectors increased by 1.7% and 0.9% respectively from 1993 to 2004.
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Chapter 3
POLICY-INDUCED VARIATION IN COLLEGE LABOR SUPPLY AND THE
SKILL PREMIUM
3.1 Introduction
Two well-documented educational trends have affected most advanced economies.
First, there is a broad increase in educational attainment (Restuccia and Vanden-
broucke, 2013). Second, there has been a general increase in the educational wage
premium, whether measured as the coefficient on return to schooling or the college-
high school wage premium (Machin and Van Reenen, 1998; Bekman, Bound, and
Machin, 1998; Katz and David, 1999). An important and still open question in the
literature is whether these two patterns are linked. An expansion of education means
changes in who acquires different levels of schooling. For example, one hypothesis
would be that the expansion has led progressively less able students to attend and
graduate from college over time. This raises two questions: is this hypothesis true?
And if so, can it help us understand the patterns of wage premiums?
A small literature has sought to answer this question, with an almost exclusive
focus on the United States. Here, I revisit these questions in the context of Korea.
Korea is a useful laboratory for revisiting these questions for three reasons. First, as I
have already noted, the basic patterns are shared by most advanced economies; Korea
is no exception. The relevant data are shown in Figure 3.1. 1 Figure 3.1a shows
the educational attainment by cohort, with attainment measured in four complete
and mutually exclusive categories: those with less than a high school degree; high
1Details on the construction of this and subsequent data are delayed to Section 3.2.
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school graduates; those with more than a high school degree but less than a four-year
college degree; and four-year college graduates. The expansion has been large and
rapid: while most of the 1930 birth cohort did not complete high school, nearly all
Koreans of recent birth cohorts do. Indeed, high school graduates are now a shrinking
share of the population, due to the increase in college attendance. Figure 3.1b shows
the college wage premium from 1980 onward. The wage premium fluctuated until
1995 but has risen 15–20 log points since that time.
Figure 3.1: Changes in Korean Education
(a) Expansion of Education
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These patterns are qualitatively consistent with the United States. However, a
second advantage of focusing on Korea is that the changes happened much more
rapidly and were quantitatively larger. This fact is particularly apparent for the rise
in educational attainment. The college completion rate in Korea is roughly 40 percent
today, as compared to 30 percent for the United States; it took thirty years for the
college completion rate to rise from 10 to 30 percent of the population in the United
States, but just ten years in Korea. These rapid changes are useful for my empirical
approach, which I discuss below. The third and final reason I find Korea to be a useful
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laboratory is that college dropout rates in Korea are comparatively low, roughly two
percent as opposed to twenty percent in the U.S. throughout this time period. This
fact is useful because the college wage premium is typically calculated as the wage of
college graduates relative to high school graduates. In this calculation it is unclear
whether or how to take into account those who start at a four-year college but do not
acquire a degree. This group is particularly concerning when one is considering issues
of ability and composition effects, since college dropouts are unlikely to be randomly
selected of the group that starts college. The small share of such persons in Korea
suggests that I can abstract from them without missing too much.
Our empirical strategy is twofold. First, I replicate two empirical strategies previ-
ously used in the literature to quantify ability and composition effects in the United
States. As I show below, strong assumptions are needed to identify these effects.
Each paper utilizes slightly different identifying assumptions. Our goal here is to
replicate these papers in a consistent and unified way. A common feature of the
empirical strategies is that they rely on comparing wage patterns for nearby birth
cohorts with different educational attainments. Under some assumptions, they link
differential wage patterns to the differential educational attainment. Korea offers
a clear advantage for such empirical approaches because of the larger differences in
educational attainment for nearby cohorts, which I exploit.
The second component of my empirical strategy relies on changes in educational
attainment induced by policy. The Korean government limited university enrollment
throughout my period of interest. By the late 1970s the limit was sufficiently bind-
ing that it encouraged the growth of a large tutoring industry that help high school
students score better on the college entrance exam. The change in government after
the assassination of President Park in 1979 brought large policy changes throughout
the economy. Of particular interest to us is a large and sudden increase in university
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enrollments in 1981 and 1982. Our regression discontinuity analysis below suggests
that this policy increased the post-policy university attainment by about 3 percent-
age points, as compared to pre-policy trends. I exploit this exogenous increase in
enrollment within the framework of the existing empirical strategies for alternative,
exogenous variation in the quantity of schooling.
Our analysis yields two main results. The first concerns the importance of com-
position effects in accounting for the cross-sectional return to schooling. In line with
Kaymak (2009), I find that composition effects account for nearly one-half of the
observed return to schooling, indicating that the true private return to schooling is
slightly more than half of the observed Mincer return. The magnitude of this effect is
consistent regardless of whether I use all educational variation or only exogenous edu-
cational variation to estimate the effect. The second result concerns the importance of
composition effects in the time series. Consistent with Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005), I
find evidence that increasing college attainment lowers the college wage premium for a
cohort, suggesting that higher college attainment is obtained by lowering the relative
ability of college graduates. However, the results here depend somewhat on whether I
use all the variation or only policy-induced variation in educational attainment. The
former suggests a small and relatively weak effect, while the latter suggests a much
stronger effect. Our preferred interpretation of this finding is that long-run trend
changes in educational attainment may come in part from better sorting by ability
or changes in educational preparation, in line with Hendricks and Schoellman (2014),
while sudden short-run changes in educational attainment cannot and hence cause
stronger decreases in ability and wages.
In addition to the papers listed above, I are also closely related to a number
of other studies that investigate similar issues, primarily within the United States.
Laitner (2000) formulates a model that generates qualitative predictions in line with
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what I study here, but does not attempt to quantify these forces. Recently Bowlus
and Robinson (2012) use the flat spot method of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998)
to try to identify changes in skill prices versus skill quantities in explaining changes
in wages for four educational groups in the U.S.; changes in innate ability can be
thought of as one source of changes in skill quantities. Carneiro and Lee (2011) use
a different empirical strategy that relies on controlling for all possible sources of skill
price variation to help identify skill quantities as a residual; again, ability is one
component of the quantity of skill. Carneiro and Lee (2011) use a local instrumental
variable approach to predict the wage implications of expanding college enrollment.
Unfortunately it is difficult to provide a consensus result from these papers because
the literature has yet to reach one. Some papers find modest composition effects
(Juhn, Kim, and Vella, 2005; Carneiro and Lee, 2011), but others find sizable ones
(Kaymak, 2009; Bowlus and Robinson, 2012). Our hope is to provide further evidence
to this debate by exploiting the advantages of the Korean experience outlined above.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the Korean data
and the relevant details about Korean educational policy. Section 3.3 conducts the
analysis. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Education and Education Policy in Korea
In this section I outline briefly the relevant details of the Korean educational
experience. Our focus is on two main aspects. First, I highlight the post-World War
II trends, which include a large expansion of education and a recent increase in the
college wage premium. Second, I highlight the role of exogenous policy changes in
the 1980s in affecting the educational expansion.
I measure educational attainment using the Korean population censuses conducted
in 1966 and then every five years from 1970 to 2010. Throughout this period the
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census has contained a question on the highest educational attainment of respondents.
2 I code respondents into four broad categories that are comparable over time: those
with less than a high school degree; high school graduates; those with more than a
high school degree but less than a four-year college degree; and those with at least a
four-year college degree. I measure attainment for the 1929–1977 cohorts using the
census taken when they were aged 33–37. Using this five year window with censuses
taken every five years gives us exactly one observation of attainment per cohort. The
results are plotted in Figure 3.1a. Korea has experienced a larger and more rapid rise
in education than the United States. I show in the appendix that similar patterns
hold for men and women separately.
Examination of Figure 1 shows that a substantial fraction of Koreans have more
than a high school degree but less than a four-year college degree. A similarly large
group is present in U.S. data (Hendricks and Schoellman, 2014). However, this group
contains two subgroups: those who obtain a two-year degree and those who start
college but obtain no degree. Further, the relative proportion of the subgroups varies
greatly between the U.S. and Korea. This is shown in Figure 3.2. Roughly two-
thirds of the “some college” group in the U.S. consists of those who obtain no degree,
whereas in Korea almost all students with less than a four-year degree obtain a two-
year degree. 3
A final advantage of using Korean data is that variation in educational policy
provides exogenous variation in educational attainment. The most important change
for my purposes came in the summer of 1980. High school education was available to
all students and paid for by the federal government since 1968. However, the federal
2This is also a minor advantage as compared to the United States. There the main data sources
are the Current Population Survey and the Population Census. They asked only about years of
schooling and not attainment until 1992 and 1990, which generally forces researchers to assume
that, say, workers with 12 years of schooling are high school graduates and so on.
3U.S. data taken from the March Current Population Survey.
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Figure 3.2: Decomposing the Some College Group in the U.S. and Korea
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government strictly controlled university admissions. Students took two examinations
to determine who would be admitted (Lee, 1992). As the fraction of students who
graduated high school rose, the restriction on enrollment became more binding. By
1980, nearly half of all high school students were enrolled in after-school private
tutoring to help improve their college enrollment test scores.
Education policy changed discretely after the 1979 assassination of President Park.
General Cheon assumed control of the country in 1980 and was recognized as President
in 1981. He instituted a host of reforms throughout the economy. The educational
reform had two key components. First, he banned private tutoring. Second, he
greatly expanded educational enrollments through several mechanisms: by opening
new universities; by expanding the departments per university; and by expanding
the students per department. The aggregate effect was large: total new enrollments
were nearly 50 percent larger in 1981 as compared to 1980, and enrollment in four-
year degrees were 60 percent larger. This large, exogenous increase is critical to my
empirical approach.
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In order to utilize the effect of this policy in my empirical work, I need to define
which cohorts were affected by it. It is clear that all cohorts who were age 19 or
younger in 1981 (born 1962 or later) was affected by the policy. Those who were
slightly older may have also benefited from a second chance to enter university. This
is less clear in the case of Korea, because many who were marginally denied admission
to four-year colleges would have been accepted to and attended two-year colleges
instead. Roughly two-thirds of applications to college in the early 1980s were from
high school seniors taking the college entrance for the first time; the remainder were
from repeat test-takers. 4 Nonetheless, I think of those born 1962–1964 as having
potentially been marginally affected by the policy. Those born before 1962 were
likely not affected. Hence, I intend to exploit the large rise in college attendance and
completion between cohorts born before this time and those born just after the policy
came into effect.
Figure 3.3 isolates the fraction of each birth cohort that obtains at least a four-
year college degree. The vertical line marks the 1962 cohort, which was the first to be
fully affected by the policy. By comparing the attainment of cohorts on either side I
can see that the policy did indeed increase attainment. To make this statement more
precise I estimate the effect of the policy using a regression discontinuity approach. I
consider the following specification:
Sic = α + τDi + βg(c) + εi (3.1)
where the dependent variable, S, is an indicator variable that takes on value 1 if
individual i from cohort c obtained a four-year degree. I predict this value under
the assumption that there is a smooth trend relationship between attainment and
cohort captured by g(c). D is an indicator which takes the value of 1 if c ≥ 1962
4Data from the Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1985.
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and 0 otherwise. I am interested in τ , the estimated jump effect of the policy on
educational attainment.
Figure 3.3: Fraction College Graduates by Birth Cohort
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Note: Figure shows college graduation rates by birth cohort, taken from the Korean census. The vertical line
indicates the birth cohort that was marginally exposed to the educational reform; younger cohorts to the right
were fully exposed, while older cohorts to the left were not exposed at all.
Table 3.1 gives the estimated results when I assume that the underlying trends
in cohort g(c) are captured by quadratic polynomials. I estimate a discontinuous
effect of the policy on college attainment of 3.2 percentage points (column 1), or 2.1
percentage points if I focus only on the fraction of students who graduate at least high
school (column 3). One slight complication is that I am using educational attainment
data for people drawn from different ages. I find that controlling of this possible
confounding effect using a quartic polynomial in age makes no difference for my
results (columns 2 and 4). Thus, policy induced a large change in college attainment
in Korea. To put the figure into context, note that total college attainment for
the 1980 cohort was around 25 percent, and that the policy induced an additional
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(above trend) increase of 3.2 percentage points, or roughly 12 percent of total 1980
attainment. This effect is large and gives us hope to provide alternative identification
of composition effects.
Table 3.1: Estimated Increase in College Attainment Induced by Policy
Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dependent variable: Total Fraction Fraction of High School Graduates
0.032*** 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.022***
[0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Birth Cohort Polynomial Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
Age Polynomial Controls No Quartic No Quartic
Initial Sample Size 253896 253896 160204 160204
Note: The dependent variables are whether the individual graduates a college. Each coefficient is from
a separate regression. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort quadratic polynomial and an
indicator whether or not a cohort entered a college after the educational reform. The bracketed values
indicate corresponding standard errors.
Finally, I turn my attention to the evolution of the college wage premium in Korea.
The Korean census does not collect data on wages. Instead, I use the Korean Survey
Report on Wage Structure’s annual data from 1980–2011. The survey collects data
about the characteristics of workers and their compensation from firms with ten or
more regular workers. 5 The important data for my purposes are each worker’s final
education degree, their age and gender, and their labor market earnings. The survey
5Since 1998, the sampling criteria has been extended to firms with 5 or more regular workers. I
use the information on firms with 10 or more workers only to maintain comparability of the data
over time.
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is large, containing roughly half a million workers each year. 6
In order to measure the skill premium I construct a sample along the lines of
Katz and Murphy (1992). I include only full-time, full-year workers aged 18–65 who
worked at least 35 hours per week at the time of the survey. I define hourly wages
using monthly income and hours worked per month. I use the CPI to deflate all wages
to 2010 dollars. Individuals whose real wages are less than $4.11 per hour (the 2010
minimum wage) are excluded from the sample.
I estimate the college wage premium by regressing log-hourly wages on dummies
for educational attainment, controlling for age, gender, and potential experience in-
teracted with gender, where potential experience is defined as age minus years of
schooling minus 6. The college wage premium is the estimated coefficient for having
graduated with a four-year college degree minus the estimated coefficient for having
only a high school diploma. Figure 3.1b shows the results. The college wage pre-
mium fluctuated between 0.3 and 0.4 between 1980 and 1995; from 1995 to 2010 it
rose from about 0.3 to 0.45, with some modest signs of falling recently. In the next
section I explore whether the changes in the college wage premium can be linked to
the changes in educational attainment.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
I now turn to the empirical analysis. Our goal here is to consider several ap-
proaches proposed in the literature. As I will see, these approaches generally rely on
comparing nearby birth cohorts with different education levels. Our goal is to exploit
two features of the Korean data. First, the rise in education was much sharper. Since
identification rests on comparing across cohorts, this is an advantage. Second, I have
exogenous, policy-induced variation in the supply of education.
6Further information on this survey can be found at http://laborstat.molab.go.kr
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It is useful to provide a unified treatment of the problem. To do so, I focus on the
following wage equation:
log(witc) = βt + βc + βt−c + (γt + γc + γt−c)Si + ai + εi, (3.2)
where w denotes the hourly wage, S denotes schooling, a denotes ability, and ε is
the error term. At some points I focus on the college-high school wage premium, in
which case Si ∈ {0, 1} will denote high school and college graduates, respectively; at
other I focus on the Mincerian return to schooling, in which case S ∈ [0, S¯] will be
a continuous variable. Throughout, I use subscript i for individuals, t for time, and
c for birth cohort. It follows that t − c is age. I use βt as a shorthand for a full set
of year dummies, and similarly for the remaining βs and γs. Note that I allow both
the level of wages and the return to schooling to depend in an arbitrary way on age,
year, and cohort. It is well-known that at this level of generality these effects are not
well-identified because of a linear dependence among the three; I return to this point
further below.
Our goal is to understand the role that ability plays in the patterns of average
wage by school group, given by:
E[log(witc)|S] = βt + βc + βt−c + (γt + γc + γt−c)S + E[ai|S]. (3.3)
I want to understand the importance of composition effects for wages, by which I
mean differences in E[ai|S] across cohorts and time. I will explore both discretized
and continuous schooling models, in which case the relevant expressions are
E[log(witc)|1]− E[log(witc)|0] = γt + γc + γt−c + E[ai|1]− E[ai|0] (3.4)
and
∂E[log(witc)|S]
∂S
= γt + γc + γt−c +
∂E[ai|S]
∂S
(3.5)
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Composition effects affect wages unless E[ai|1]−E[ai|0] = 0 or ∂E[ai|S]∂S = 0. How-
ever, quantifying composition effects is generally challenging, which likely explains
the diversity of approaches and results in the literature. There are two main obsta-
cles. First, ability is not observed directly. Some datasets include proxies for ability
(such as standardized test scores), but it is necessary to account for the noise inherent
in test scores (Taubman and Wales, 1972; Bishop, 1989; Hendricks and Schoellman,
2014). The Korean data, and most other large datasets worldwide such as censuses,
lack such proxies. A second challenge is that both of these wage equations suffer from
a classic collinearity between age, time, and cohort effects. This collinearity is wors-
ened by the inclusion of ability conditional on schooling. Since schooling is usually
fixed by cohort in the empirical analysis, this implies that mean ability conditional
on schooling is itself another cohort effect.
In some cases it is possible to rule out the importance of age, time, or cohort
effects, but that does not appear to be the case here. It is well-known that the college
wage premium varies by age. Time effects are naturally suggested by the typical
framework that models the wages of college and high-school educated workers as a
function of the quantity of workers with the two types of skill and the prevailing level
of skill-biased technical change in the economy (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Goldin and
Katz, 2008). I have already discussed that cohort effects capture (at least) the role
for differences in ability conditional on schooling.
Thus I conclude that empirical progress depends on confronting these two chal-
lenges. I now discuss and implement the approaches suggested in the literature.
Throughout, I emphasize how composition effects can be identified and separated
from time or age effects.
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3.3.1 An Instrumental Variable Approach
Our first approach follows Kaymak (2009). Kaymak works with the continuous
school model in equation (3.2) and a linear return to schooling. He uses a cohort-
based instrumental variable approach to estimate the return to schooling. Intuitively,
a valid instrument allows one to measure the true return to schooling γt + γc + γt−c,
whereas OLS estimates are biased and yield γt+γc+γt−c+
∂E[ai|S]
∂S
. Simple subtraction
yields an estimate for the cross-sectional role of ability bias ∂E[ai|S]
∂S
. Note that this
approach also sidesteps the age-time-cohort problem by not attempting to disentangle
them at all.
Kaymak proposes using cohort dummies as instruments. Cohort dummies are
clearly exogenous to an individual and highly correlated with school attainment (even
more so in Korea). It is less clear whether they satisfy the exclusion restriction. That
restriction requires that cohort only affects wages through its affect on average edu-
cational attainment. It precludes effects that might arise through, say, labor market
conditions upon first arrival to the labor market, which would likely be common to a
cohort. Kaymak (2009) proposes and implements a number of controls to help capture
such effects. Here I explore an alternative approach, which is to use my educational
policy change as an alternative instrument that affected schooling and satisfies the
exclusion restriction.
I start by following Kaymak (2009) closely. I estimate the effect of years of school-
ing on real wage using the data from the Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure.
7 I implement my regression as:
log(witc) = βt + γSi + βXi + εi.
where X includes control variables: a quartic trend in cohort (to capture slow-moving,
7The detailed description of the sample is provided in Appendix C.1.
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cohort-specific trends such as changes in mean ability (Flynn, 1984, 2007)); a quartic
function of age (to capture returns to experience); and dummies for survey year. I
estimate this equation three ways: by OLS, and then using two different instruments.
Table 3.2: Return to Education
Dependent V ariable : log(RealWage per Hours)
LS IV
(1) (2) (3)
100 × Years of Education 7.01*** 4.34*** 2.85***
[0.006] [0.143] [0.372]
Instruments N/A Year of Birth Educational Reform
Observations 8,018,485
R-squared 0.480 0.392 0.392
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: I include a quartic age trend, a quartic year of birth trend and dummies for survey
year. The instrument in column (2) is a full set of birth cohort dummies; in column (3) it
is a dummy for cohorts born in the three-year window 1962–1964 who were most suddenly
affected by the educational reform.
Table 3.2 displays the estimation results. The estimates in columns (1) and (2)
are quite comparable to Kaymak (2009) and indicate that a little more than half of
the return to education (4.34/7.01) is true return to schooling, while the other half is
due to composition effects. In column (3) I explore my alternative instrument. Our
instrument variable is dummy for the cohorts who were born between 1962–1964. I
find out that a little more than one over third of the return to education (2.85/7.01)
is true return to schooling and composition effects are a little larger than the result
in column (2).
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I then follow Kaymak (2009) by estimating the same equation separately for each
decade. Our goal here is to assess whether the patterns of the skill premium observed
in Figure 3.1b are accounted for by composition effects or by changes in skill prices.
The results are given in Table 3.3. The least squares estimates are in line with the
changes in the college wage premium plotted in Figure 3.3, showing first a decline in
the 1990s and then a pronounced rise to higher levels in the 2000s. In column (2) I
again show the result of instrumenting for attainment using cohort as in Kaymak. I
find evidence that the return to schooling is increasing over time. Taking the difference
between columns (1) and (2) suggests a nonlinear pattern: ability bias was the largest
in the 1980s, declined in the 1990s, and rose again in the 2000s. In column (3) I again
explore the role of using my alternative instrument that controls 1962–1964 born
cohorts. As I already show for the whole period, true return to schooling is smaller
than when I use the instrument in Kaymak. When I use my instrument variable, true
return to schooling is statistically zero in 1980s and 2000s.
3.3.2 A Distributional Approach
Our second approach follows Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005). These authors work
with the discretized school model in equation (3.4) and discrete schooling groups.
Their approach is based on an assumption about how cohort effects will enter the
wage equation. The intuition is conveyed by Figure 3.4, which draws closely on a
similar figure in their paper. To simplify, suppose that ability is (log-) normally
distributed and that selection by ability into educational attainment is perfect. In
this case there is an ability cutoff for each cohort λ∗ such that all higher-ability
individuals complete college and work as college graduates, while all lower-ability
individuals do not attend college and work as high school graduates. An expansion
of college attainment means a shift left in the cutoff, so that the individuals that
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Table 3.3: Patterns of the Return to Education: 1980–2010
LS IV
Year (1) (2) (3)
1981-1990 7.2*** 3.8*** 1.6
[0.008] [0.419] [1.495]
1991-2000 5.8*** 4.1*** 2.9***
[0.009] [0.261] [0.497]
2001-2010 8.7*** 1.9*** -0.7
[0.014] [0.269] [0.611]
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I control for a quadratic age trend, a
quadratic trend in year of birth, survey year,
cohort size by education and survey year
are shaded light gray now graduate college instead of only completing high school.
Under this simple and clear model of selection effects, mean relative ability by cohort
E(ai,t−v|s = 1) − E(ai,t−v|s = 0) can be proxied for by using the fraction of the
population that attains college for each cohort.
This approach obviously embeds strong assumptions about how ability effects
work. Hendricks and Schoellman (2014) find that there are two important compli-
cations to this view of selection effects. First, the sorting of students ability into
attainment is not perfect, as the figure suggests. Second, there are not only two mu-
tually exclusive school categories as that figure suggests. Hendricks and Schoellman
(2014) find that both of these factors play an important role in the U.S. Their results
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Figure 3.4: A Simplified View of Composition Effects
Ability (λ) 
denstiy f(λ) 
λ* λ* 
Addional enrollment in response 
to the education reform 
suggest, for example, that the expansion of education had essentially no effect on the
mean ability of college graduates, although it did cause a decline in the mean ability
of high school graduates. These findings suggest it may be worthwhile to explore
alternative assumptions.
I do so by once again exploiting my exogenous educational policy change. These
approaches exploit the idea that while long-term changes in educational attainment
may be complicated by simultaneous trends in sorting and the attainment of some
college, large short-run changes are unlikely to be. Hence, instead of asking whether
the growth in college attainment over the long run has caused changes in the college
wage premium, I ask whether the large growth in college attainment induced by the
policy reform cause changes in the affected cohorts’ college wage premium.
I start by following Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005) closely. They suggest the equiv-
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alent of differencing equation (3.4) over time,
∆
E[log(witc)|s = 1]
E[log(witc)|s = 0] = ∆γc + ∆γt−c + ∆[E(ai|1)− E(ai|0)].
which has the effect of netting out time effects. They assume that cohort effects
and changes in mean ability are accounted for by changes in average educational
attainment, ∆γc + ∆[E(ai|1)−E(ai|0)] = ω∆[E(sitc)] I use a regression of education
on age and cohort dummies to predict for each cohort the average attainment at age
35, which I use as E[sitc].
Before giving the regression results it is useful to look at the raw relationship
between the college wage premium and the fraction of the population with a col-
lege degree. The two are plotted together in Figure 3.5. Each panel of this figure
corresponds to one five-year differenced comparison; for example, the top left panel
shows the difference in wages and attainment when comparing similarly aged workers
between 1980 and 1985. The blue line in each figure shows the five-year change in the
college wage premium, while the red line shows the five-year change in the fraction of
the population who graduates college. The correlation between the two is generally
weak, much weaker than what Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005) find in the United States.
However I also shade in each figure in gray the cohorts that were marginally affected
by the educational reform. I can see in each figure that the reform consistently in-
duced an unusually large increase in attainment and that the college wage premium
consistently declined.
To check these visual results I estimate the above equation using weighted least
squares. Table 3.4 reports the estimation results. In column (1) I follow Juhn, Kim,
and Vella (2005) and estimate the change in the college wage premium as a function
of the change in the share of the cohort in college. I find a negative result consistent
with their work, but the estimate is imprecise. In columns (2)–(5) I explore the value
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Figure 3.5: Log Change in Relative Wage and College Share
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of incorporating my educational reform. In these regressions I continue to include
the share of the cohort that graduates college, but I also include a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 for cohorts that were marginally affected by the educational
reform. The difference between columns (2)–(5) lies only in the which cohorts I define
as having been affected. In column (2) I use a strict definition, the 1962–1964 cohorts.
In column (3) I expand the affected cohorts to the 1962–1966 cohorts; in column (4)
I expand it to the 1962–1971 cohorts; and last in column (5) I expand it to the
1962–1976 cohorts.
The results of regressions (2)–(5) agree closely. In each case the effect of cohort
college share is of the wrong sign and is statistically insignificant. This indicates that
for cohorts not affected by the educational reform, there is no strong relationship
between the fraction graduating college and college wage premiums. As explained
above this could be the case if offsetting forces (such as changes in the structure
of education, education quality, or the sorting of students) offset the increase in
attainment. Indeed, it could be the case that such forces are themselves responsible
in part for causing the increase one educational attainment. The regressions also
agree closely on the effect of the educational reform. Marginally affected cohorts
have statistically and economically lower college wage premiums, on the order of 18–
23 log points, as compared to the unaffected cohorts (those born earlier or much later).
As I expand the scope of the number of cohorts affected, I find that the estimated
effect declines. The intuition is that the rapid expansion in education that took place
at this time was exogenous and happened too quickly to be offset by other factors.
In this case, the policy had the expected effect consistent with the findings of Juhn,
Kim, and Vella (2005).
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Table 3.4: Effects of Cohort-Specific College Share on Wages of College Graduate
Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent V ariable : ∆E[log(witc)|s=1]E[log(witc)|s=0]
Cohort College Share -0.081 -0.009 0.065 -0.011 -0.050
[0.130] [0.134] [0.136] [0.134] [0.135]
Cohort Size -0.249** -0.243** -0.275*** -0.282*** -0.269**
[0.103] [0.103] [0.101] [0.104] [0.106]
Education Reform -0.188** -0.233*** -0.129* -0.057
[0.095] [0.077] [0.066] [0.069]
Constant -0.166 -0.192 -0.211 0.214 0.419***
[0.154] [0.153] [0.152] [0.152] [0.153]
Observations 230 230 230 230 230
R-squared 0.321 0.335 0.353 0.335 0.324
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I use wage information for the dependent variable from Report on Wage Structure Survey. In
each column I use predicted college share of each cohort at age 35 as specified in equation (1)
in Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005). The regression also includes controls for cohort size, seven year
dummy variables, and two age dummy variables for young and middle age workers. Education
Reform is a dummy that indicates cohorts affected by the educational reform as explained in the
text. Each column describe the cohorts who were born within 3 years in (2), 5 years in (3), 10
years in (4) and 15 years in (5) after the education reform passed.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper I study the importance of composition effects for education wage
premiums in Korea. Korea offers an interesting case because it has experienced a rise
in educational attainment and education wage premiums, like most other advanced
economies. However, the rise in education was much larger and more rapid than that
in most other advanced economies. Further, some of the increase was policy-induced.
I used a simple empirical framework to introduce the main challenges confronted
in the literature. I then implemented several procedures suggested in the literature
to overcome these challenges. I also showed how to modify the existing approaches
to exploit my policy-related variation in educational attainment.
Our findings are robust across the approaches and specifications. I find only mod-
est evidence for composition effects in the long run. By this I mean that more educated
workers are of higher average ability, but there is little change in the strength of this
relationship over time. However, I find strong evidence for a decrease in education
wage premiums for the cohorts most affected by the policy-induced expansion of ed-
ucation. This suggests to us that composition effects do operate, but that they can
be masked by offsetting forces when studied over longer horizons. While Hendricks
and Schoellman (2014) suggest some possible forces that operated in the U.S., it is
not clear that these forces generalize to Korea or other advanced economies. This is
an open question for future work.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Distribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Family Imports
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Note: The fraction of Korean foreign affiliates depending on the share of pur-
chases from the parent and other family affiliates in 2010. I define developing and
developed countries based on Korea’s PPP GDP per capita.
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Figure A.2: FDistribution of Affiliates by The Share of Intra-Family Imports
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Note: The fraction of Korean foreign affiliates depending on the share of purchases
from the parent and other family affiliates in 2010. I define manufacturing and
others following KSIC.
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A.2 Derivations
Proposition 1. If β > 0 and α < 1, there exists a feasible choice of a foreign affiliate
which satisfies that ∂log
(
Y
E
)/
∂log
(
Mk
M
)
is positive.
Proof. Start from the production function.
Y =
(
F (Mk)
)β(
(αMk +Mn)γL1−γ
)1−β
Dividing by E
Y
E
=
(
F (Mk)
)β(
(αMk +Mn)γL1−γ
)1−β
1
E
=
(
F (Mk)
)β(
(αMk +Mn)γ
(L
E
)1−γ)1−β( 1
E
)(γ+β−γβ)
=
(
F (Mk)
M
)β((
α
Mk
M
+
Mn
M
)γ(L
E
)1−γ)1−β(M
E
)(γ+β−γβ)
by definition of M and E
=
(
F (Mk)
M
)β((
α
Mk
M
+ 1− M
k
M
)γ(
1− M
E
)1−γ)1−β(M
E
)(γ+β−γβ)
=
(
F (Mk)
M
)β((
(α− 1)M
k
M
+ 1
)γ(
1− M
E
)1−γ)1−β(M
E
)(γ+β−γβ)
Taking log,
log
(
Y
E
)
= βlog
(
F (Mk)
M
)
+ γ(1− β)log
(
(α− 1)M
k
M
+ 1
)
+
+(1− γ)(1− β)log
(
1− M
E
)
+ (γ + β − γβ)log
(
M
E
)
Given M and E, differentiating by log
(
Mk
M
)
∂log
(
Y
E
)
∂log
(
Mk
M
) = βMkF ′(Mk)
F (Mk)
+ γ(1− β)Mk α− 1
(α− 1)Mk +M
Now, suppose that for all feasible sets, the following is satisfied
∂log
(
Y
E
)
∂log
(
Mk
M
) ≤ 0
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Then,
−βF
′(Mk)
F (Mk)
≥ γ(1− β) α− 1
(α− 1)Mk +M
Given a bounded exogenous shock (z), RHS of the above equation is a negative
bounded number. However, since F ′(Mk) → ∞ as Mk → 0, LHS converges to
negative infinity. So it is in contradiction.
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Proposition 2. If β > 0 and αw
n
wk
< 1, consider z′ and z such that z′ > z,
there exist optimal choices from the affiliates’ maximization problems that satisfy that
Yamcit(z
′) > Yamcit(z) and M
k
Mk+Mn
(z′) < M
k
Mk+Mn
(z).
Proof. For simplicity, I only consider z′ and z that guarantee non-negative solutions.
When z′ > z, then Yamcit(z′) > Yamcit(z) is trivial.
From the FOC,
• (Mk) : βzF (Mk)β−1F ′(Mk)(αMk +Mn)γ(1−β)L(1−γ)(1−β) + · · ·
+zF (Mk)βγ(1− β)(αMk +Mn)γ(1−β)−1L(1−γ)(1−β)α = wk
• (Mn) : zF (Mk)βγ(1− β)(αMk +Mn)γ(1−β)−1L(1−γ)(1−β) = wn
• (L) : zF (Mk)β(αMk +Mn)γ(1−β)(1− γ)(1− β)L(1−γ)(1−β)−1 = wL
From the FOC for Mn and L, I can have L
(αMk+Mn)
= (1−γ)
γ
wn
wL
. Therefore, given wages
wn and wL, ∂(αM
k+Mn)
∂Y
are positive. From the FOC for Mk and Mn, I can find the
optimal choice between Mk and Mn by comparing the marginal return per unit cost.
Suppose that M
k
Mk+Mn
(z′) ≥ Mk
Mk+Mn
(z) for all optimal choices. Because the affiliates
chooses only one between Mk(z) and Mn(z) exclusively and Mk(z) increases, the
marginal product of unit cost of Mk(z) is always larger than that of Mn(z).
β
γ(1− β)
F ′(Mk)
F (Mk)
(αMk +Mn) + α ≥ w
k
wn
(A.1)
As Mk → M¯k, however, F ′(Mk) → 0 and LHS → α. Then αwn
wk
≥ 1. So it is in
contradiction.
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A.3 Robustness
In Section 1.4.1, I provided evidence of a positive association between the share
of Korean managers and labor productivity in Korean foreign affiliates. I used the
equation based on the model’s prediction for the results. Because of logarithm rela-
tions between the share of Korean managers and labor productivity, I needed to drop
some observations from my sample. About ten percent of the observations have neg-
ative value-added, which makes them have negative labor productivity, and about 19
percent of observations have no Korean managers, which make them have zero share
of Korean managers. In this section, to consider all observations, I use a different
specification regarding the following linear relation between labor productivity and
the share of Korean managers instead of logarithm
Table 13 shows that the results from the estimation using the whole sample are
consistent with the results of Table 9. Column (1) shows that a one-point increase in
the share of Koreans in management positions is positively associated with about a
0.7-point increase in labor productivity. Interestingly, in this specification, the effect
of intra-firm imports is statistically insignificant in column (2). So I confirm that my
result is not sensitive because of the drop due to the logarithm.
Table A.1: Effect on Labor Productivity
Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity
VARIABLES (1) (2)
Korean managers
Total managers 0.748*** 0.749***
[0.283] [0.283]
Total managers
Total employees 0.891*** 0.891***
[0.340] [0.341]
Intra−firm import
Total purchase 0.036
[0.132]
Observations 10,416 10,416
R-squared 0.110 0.110
Number of Affiliates 3,679 3,679
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table shows the estimation results of equation 1.6 using a different
specification to use all 10,416 affiliates. See note in Table 9. From 11,254
affiliates, 838 foreign affiliate have zero employees in management positions.
96
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Proof of Lemma and Proposition
Lemma 1. Total labor demand is decreasing in ω and decreasing in P in the general
equilibrum
Proof. Step 1: LM is decreasing in ω and decreasing in P .
In the equilibrium, the distribution of firm productivities µ is endogenously de-
cided by firm’s optimal investment decisions where
µ = ln(piβ(1− δ)[exp(zH)− exp(zL)]/h) + (1− σ) lnω − lnP
So
∂µ
∂ω
=
1− σ
ω
< 0
and
∂µ
∂P
= − 1
P
< 0
given the expression of labor engaged in the manufacturing sector in the equation
2.22, and apply the chain rule:
∂LM(µ, ω, P )
∂ω
=
∂LM(µ, ω, P )
∂µ
∂µ
∂ω
+
∂LM(µ, ω, P )
∂ω
< 0
and
∂LM(µ, ω, P )
∂P
=
∂LM(µ, ω, P )
∂µ
∂µ
∂P
< 0
Step 2: LN is decreasing in ω and decreasing in P .
LN = (1− α)( λ
1− λP
∗1−ρ
T (
ω
θ
)ρ−1 + 1)−1(Lt +
N
ω
(µd(zH) + (1− µ)d(zL)))
Let
A(ω(µ)) = (1− α)( λ
1− λP
∗1−ρ
T (
ω
θ
)ρ−1 + 1)−1
and
B(µ, ω(µ)) = Lt +
N
ω
(µd(zH) + (1− µ)d(zL))
Then
LN = A(ω(µ)) ∗B(µ, ω(µ))
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I can easily show that ∂A(ω)
∂ω
< 0
From the definition of dividend,
µd(zH) + (1− µ)d(zL) = (µpi(zH) + (1− µ)pi(zL))− PheqH
By equation 2.16 and 2.19
= piω1−σ((µ exp(zH)+(1-µ)exp(zL))-β(1-δ)[exp(zH)-exp(zL)])
So,
B(µ, ω) = Lt + Npiω
−σ((µ exp(zH)+(1-µ)exp(zL))-β(1-δ)[exp(zH)-exp(zL)])
Since I know ∂µ
∂ω
= 1−σ
ω
< 0 and ∂µ
∂P
= − 1
P
< 0, and through the chain rule:
∂B(µ, ω)
∂ω
=
∂B(µ, ω)
∂µ
∂µ
∂ω
+
∂B(µ, ω)
∂ω
< 0
and
∂B(µ, ω)
∂P
=
∂LM(µ, ω)
∂µ
∂µ
∂P
< 0
So
∂LN(µ, ω, P )
∂ω
=
∂A(ω)
∂ω
+
∂B(µ, ω)
∂ω
< 0
and
∂LN(µ, ω, P )
∂P
=
∂B(µ, ω)
∂P
< 0
Since the total demand of labor equals the sum of demand from the manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sector.
LM + LN = LD,
LD(ω,P )
∂ω
< 0 and LD(ω,P )
∂P
< 0
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Proposition 3. There exists a unique stationary recursive equilibrium.
Proof. In the equilibrium, the wage and price level is pinned down by labor market
and final market clearing conditions.
1. Labor market clearing condition: LD = LS
Since LS is a fixed number, LD is decreasing in ω and decreasing in P .
All the equilibrium P satisfing the labor market clearing condition must mono-
tomically decreasing with equilibrium wage level ω.
2. Final good clearing condition under optimal choice of aggregating firms gives:
P = (
PM
α
)α(
PS
1− α)
1−α
PS = ((1− λ)(ω
θ
)1−ρ + λP ∗1−ρT )
1
1−ρ
All the equilibrium P satisfing the final good and intermediate good clearing con-
sition must monotonically increasing in equilibrium wage level ω.
So, the (ω, P ) which satisfied both equilibrium condition must be unique.
And from this wage price level pair, the entire equilibrium under this price system
is unique.
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Lemma 2. If ρ→∞, there is a pair of (θ, λ) satisfying ∂ω∗
∂λ
= 0 and ∂P
∗
∂θ
= 0
Proof. Let’s do the direct effect and indirect effect separately.
Direct Effect:
By the equation 2.23
∂LN
∂λ
= −(1−α)(Lt+N
ω
(µd(zH)+(1−µ)d(zL)))(P ∗1−ρT (
ω
θ
)ρ−1)(λP ∗1−ρT (
ω
θ
)ρ−1+1−λ)−2
As λ→ 0, ∂LN
∂λ
→ −∞ while as λ→ 1, ∂LN
∂λ
→ 0
Indirect Effect:
By the equation 2.21, 2.12, 2.22 and 2.23
∂P
∂λ
(
∂LM
∂P
+
∂LN
∂P
) > 0 for all λ
Since lim
ρ→∞
∂LN
∂λ
→ −∞, there exist an ρ¯λ, for all ρ > ρ¯λ, such that limλ→0 ∂LN∂λ +
∂P
∂λ
(∂LM
∂P
+ ∂LN
∂P
) < 0 and limλ→1 ∂ω
∗
∂λ
> 0
which implies that there is a correspondence of λ(θ) , where the net effect of
∂ω
∂λ
|λ=λ(θ)= 0
Similarly,
∂LN
∂θ
= (ρ− 1)(1− α)( λ
1− λP
∗1−ρ
T (
ω
θ
)ρ−1 + 1)−2(Lt +
N
ω
(µD(zH) + · · ·
· · ·+ (1− µ)D(zL)))( λ
1− λP
∗1−ρ
T (
ω
θ
)ρ−1
1
θ
)
As θ → ω
P ∗T
, ∂LN
∂θ
→∞ while as θ → 0, ∂LN
∂θ
→ 0
Therefore ∂ω
∂θ
(∂LM
∂ω
+ ∂LN
∂ω
) < 0 for all θ
Since lim
ρ→∞
∂LN
∂θ
→ ∞, there exist an ρ¯θ, for all ρ > ρ¯θ, such that limθ→ ω
P∗
T
∂LN
∂θ
+
∂ω
∂θ
(∂LM
∂ω
+ ∂LN
∂ω
) > 0 and limθ→0 ∂P
∗
∂θ
< 0
This implies a correspondence of θ(λ) , where the net effect of ∂P
∂θ
|θ=θ(λ)= 0
Let ρˆ = max{ρ¯λ, ρ¯θ}, for all ρ > ρˆ
The points on the intersection of this two correspondence would satisfies my re-
quirement.
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Proposition 4. If ρ→∞ and a pair of (θ,λ) satisfies ∂ω∗
∂λ
= 0 and ∂P
∗
∂θ
= 0, increases
in θ and λ both increase the welfare of the economy, but the effect on productivity and
labor in the manufacturing sector is opposite.
Proof. Given the above ρˆ, for all ρ > ρˆ , there exists some point satisfied the condition
chracterized by lemma 2.
Starting from the these (θ, λ), when θ increases by a small amount dθ, dP ∗ =
∂P ∗
∂θ
dθ = 0 and dω∗ = ∂ω
∗
∂θ
dθ > 0.
When λ increases by a small amount dλ, dω∗ = ∂ω
∗
∂λ
dλ = 0 and dP ∗ = ∂P
∗
∂λ
dλ < 0
Since the equilibrium µ is a function of (ω, P ) and ∂µ
∂ω
= 1−σ
ω
< 0 and ∂µ
∂P
= − 1
P
< 0
µ is increasing as λ increases, and decreasing as θ increases.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Data Descriptions
C.1.1 Sample for Analysis 2: Kaymak 2009
To estimate the effect of years of schooling on real wage following Kaymak (2009),
I use the yearly data from Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure between 1980
to 2011. The sample is restricted to men between 25- and 60-years-old. Then the
sample include cohorts, who were born in the same year, born between 1920-1985.
Wages are measured by hour earnings that are calculated by dividing monthly
wage and salary earnings by monthly worked hours. Using CPI in 2010, I convert
the wages to real wages. The Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure provides 5
groups of education attainments; Elementary, Middle and High schools, some college
and four-years university. I assign 6, 9, 12, 14 and 16 years to each group for years
of schooling respectively. I drop workers with less than half of the minimum wages
in 2010, $4.11 and I also drop workers who worked less than 35 hours per week.
C.1.2 Sample for Analysis 3: Juhn, Kim, and Vella 2005
To estimate relation between college wages premium and college share following
Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005), I use the data from both Korean Survey Report on Wage
Structure and Korea Population Census. For information about the real wages, I use
wage profile from the Korean Survey Report on Wage Structure from 1980 to 2010
every 5-year. Wages are measured by hour earnings that are calculated by dividing
monthly wage and salary earnings by monthly worked hours. Using CPI in 2010, I
convert the wages to real wages. I drop workers with less than half of the minimum
wages in 2010, $4.11. and I also drop workers who worked less than 35 hours per
week. I get the numbers of college and non-college graduates from the data from
Korean population census. I also restrict the sample to men between 27 and 65 years
old and women between 23 and 65 years to consider people who under a schooling.
To get the numbers of college graduates and non-college graduates for each cohort,
I predict college share of each cohort at age 35 as a specified equation provided by
Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005) using Korean population census data. I predicted every
5 years using the data from Korean population census 1966 and from 1970 to 2010.
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C.2 Figures
Figure C.1: Educational Attainment by Birth Cohort (Men)
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Note: Educational attainment measured in four mutually exclusive and exhaustive
categories. Attainment measured using 33-37 year-olds in the 1966 or 1970–2010
Korean population censuses, which provides a unique observation for each birth
cohort.
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Figure C.2: Educational Attainment by Birth Cohort (Women)
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Note: Educational attainment measured in four mutually exclusive and exhaustive
categories. Attainment measured using 33-37 year-olds in the 1966 or 1970–2010
Korean population censuses, which provides a unique observation for each birth
cohort.
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